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Learning by making errors: When and why errors help memory, and the metacognitive illusion 
that errors are hurtful for learning 
 
Barbie J. Huelser 
 
 
This body of work begins to investigate the following three overarching questions on 
errors and learning. First, when are errors helpful for memory? Second, why are errors 
beneficial in certain circumstances? Third, are learners aware of when errors 
are advantageous for learning? 
            These questions cover two unique dimensions of learning by making errors, both from a 
memory and a metacognitive point of view. From a memory perspective, it might seem 
surprising that making an error compared to simply studying (no mistakes) could be beneficial 
for memory. We began our investigations with a replication and extension of previous work on 
the error generation effect: When does making errors enhance correct retention above studying? 
By investigating boundary conditions, this helps inform theory of the mechanism responsible for 
the error generation effect. We found that error generation only enhanced retention for related 
materials but not for unrelated word-pairs, and therefore, confirm that the error generation 
benefit is more than simply due to the act of generation. 
However, what is the role of the error: Does it serve as a semantic mediator linking 
directly to the semantically related target, or can the error serve as an episodic link, bridging to 
the original learning episode, even if it is not directly linked to the target? If a learner remembers 
her error, does this help or hurt memory for the correct answer? By using materials that enabled 
errors that were either congruent (related) or incongruent (unrelated) to the correct answer, we 
 
 v 
found generating errors during learning led to benefits of memory, both when the error was 
congruent and incongruent to the target. Furthermore, when one could recall her error at test, 
correct answer memory was higher than when one could not recall her original error. These 
findings suggest that just a semantic explanation for the error generation is likely insufficient, 
and point to the importance of episodic recollection at retrieval for error generation to aid 
memory above study alone. 
Lastly, we investigated this errorful learning methodology from a metacognitive 
perspective. Even when errors were beneficial for learning, we found that learners were unaware 
of the memorial advantage. We sought to ensure this underconfidence was not merely a function 
of poor performance accuracy or source monitoring. We were also interested in exploring if this 
bias was stable, or if one could correctly update her metacognitive knowledge simply by making 
item-level judgments. These initial projects open the doors for exciting research investigating 
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Recent research has shown that producing an error, so long as it is followed by corrective 
feedback, resulted in better retention of the correct answers than simply studying the correct 
answers. We wanted to investigate this surprising finding from two vantage points: memory and 
metacognition. 
In the first two chapters, we consider this puzzle of error generation from a memory 
mechanism point of view. In Chapter 1, we explored a replication of this finding in which the 
errors were always related to the target, and examined whether there are situations in which error 
generation might not be beneficial, in particular, when the errors were unrelated to the to-be-
remembered target item. By investigating boundary conditions for this effect we could begin to 
tease apart if errors were helpful merely due to active processing or because of the attention paid 
to the feedback post-error. In either case, one would expect the error generation effect for both 
related and unrelated materials. However, if errors are important either due to mediation or 
semantic activation of the correct response, we should expect an error generation effect only for 
related materials. In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants studied either related (Experiment 1a) 
or unrelated word pairs (Experiment 1b), manipulated between participants. Participants were 
either given the cue and target to study for 5 s or 10 s in the read conditions, or they generated an 
error in response to the cue for the first 5 s before receiving the correct answer for the final 
5s. When the cues and targets were related, error generation led to the highest correct 
retention. However, consistent with the hypothesis, no benefit was derived from generating an 
error when the cue and target were unrelated. Experiment 1c replicated these findings in a 
within-participants design. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, learners did not 
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know that generating an error enhanced memory, even after they had just completed the task that 
produced substantial benefits.  
In Chapter 2, we sought to elaborate further upon possible mechanisms of the error 
generation effect. One explanation is based on how closely related the error is to the correct 
answer (semantic mediation hypothesis). We tested the role of the semantic link between the 
error and the target item by using polysemous materials to create congruent (wrist-palm-hand) 
and incongruent (tree-palm-hand) triplets. Participants generated errors that were 
congruent/related (cue: wrist-palm-   ?   ; error: finger) or incongruent/unrelated (cue: tree-palm-
__?__ ; error: coconut) to the correct answer (hand). A benefit for error generation was found in 
the congruent condition, as expected. However, even in the incongruent condition, when there 
was no semantic link between the mistake (coconut) and correct answer (hand), error generation 
was still beneficial for correct target memory (Experiment 2a). This advantage only occurred, 
however, when the original error was also recalled on the final memory test (Experiment 2b). 
These novel findings do not support the Semantic Mediation account as the sole explanation for 
the error generation effect. Instead, we propose the Episodic Recollection hypothesis: making an 
error can serve as an episodic memory link to the correct answer. 
Chapter 3 addresses the new finding from Chapter 1, that learners are unaware that error 
generation is beneficial for memory under many circumstances, and attempts to answer whether 
or not these impressions are fixed or malleable. Our aim was to try to enable learners to 
overcome this metacognitive disconnect. We used similar methods and materials as in Chapter 1 
(Experiment 1a). However, in Experiment 3a, a between participants manipulation was 
introduced on the final cued recall test. The control (no monitoring) group completed the final 
test without an additional task, which was akin to the procedure in Chapter 1. The Experimental 
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group (confidence monitoring) monitored performance on an item-level by providing a 
confidence rating of accuracy for each response on the final test. After completing the cued recall 
test, all participants made a subjective Global Retrospective Estimate of Performance (GREP) 
for each learning condition (read short, read long, error generation). Though error generation 
produced the best correct retention, both groups were underconfident in their retrospective 
performance estimates. The error generation metacognitive illusion was reduced, though not 
eliminated, through the use of item-level performance monitoring (in the Experimental group of 
confidence monitoring). In Experiment 3b, in addition to confidence judgments, half of the 
participants were also asked on the recall test to indicate how each item had originally been 
presented during learning. The design was a (2 (confidence monitoring on cued recall: yes, no) x 
2 (source monitoring on cued recall: yes, no) X 3 (learning condition: read short, read long, error 
generation) [within-participants], mixed design). Monitoring confidence or source during test led 
to greater global retrospective estimates of performance (GREPs) than those who did not monitor 
their performance or how an item was originally studied. Monitoring also had consequences for 
future learning strategy selection; Monitoring during the criterion test led to a greater number of 
error generation items selected for a future test, compared to when no overt monitoring occurred 
during recall. In summary, performance and source monitoring at the item-level aided in 
updating metacognitive knowledge about the effectiveness of learning by making errors.   
This collection of work covers only a small portion of possibilities that will elucidate 













































The Impact of Errors on Memory 
This first chapter addresses the effect of making errors on learning.  Should one learn by 
studying materials without making mistakes, or by attempting to produce the answers and 
committing the inevitable errors that such attempts entail? When errors are left uncorrected, they 
typically remain incorrect (Butler, Karpicke & Roediger, 2008; Fazio, Huelser, Johnson & 
Marsh, 2010; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2007; Pashler, Cepeda, Wixted & Roher, 2005; Pashler, 
Zarow & Triplett, 2003). However, feedback is highly effective in allowing the learner to correct 
previously incorrect answers (Butler et al. 2008; Metcalfe, Kornell & Finn, 2009; Pashler et al., 
2003; Pashler et al., 2005). In this chapter, only errors followed by corrective feedback were 
considered. The question here was whether, and under what conditions, committing an error 
facilitates learning. Although the main focus of this chapter is the memorial consequences for 
errorful as compared to errorless learning, a related question of interest is: Are learners aware of 
the circumstances in which committing errors can be effective for improving learning? Accurate 
metacognitive knowledge is important for metacognitive control and strategy selection (Metcalfe 
& Finn, 2008; Kornell & Son, 2009). If one is not aware of the potential efficacy of a learning 
strategy, the learner might implement suboptimal strategies. Hence, one's metacognitions about 
the effects of errors may be nearly as important as the effects of the errors themselves.  
From a theoretical standpoint, there is reason to believe that even corrected errors might 
impede learning. An error, in essence, is often thought to be conflicting or competing 
information with regard to the correct response. As such, it should create an interference 
situation. In standard proactive interference paradigms, the first pairing of a target (B) with a 
particular cue (A) results in interference when the cue A is later paired with a different response 
(C) (Anderson & Neely, 1996; Anderson & Reder, 1999; Barnes & Underwood, 1959; Loftus, 
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1979; Melton & Irwin, 1940; McGeoch, 1952; Osgood, 1949; Webb, 1917). Though there are 
several theories concerning how this interference arises (e.g., Anderson, 1973; Anderson & 
Bower, 1972; Eich, 1982; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Hintzman, 1984; Metcalfe, 1990; Osgood, 
1949), there is general agreement that it does occur. Interference from errors might be expected 
to be even greater than interference theory would normally predict, since interference theory 
does not take into account whether or not the interfering information is self-produced. Incorrect 
information that is self-generated might be even more difficult to overcome than a provided 
response, because the process of self-generation has been shown to enhance memory for the 
response (Slamecka & Graf, 1978; for reviews see Bertsch, Pesta, Wiscott & McDaniel, 2007; 
Mulligan & Lozito, 2005).  
In accordance with the rationale described above, it has sometimes been recommended 
that errors during learning be eliminated (Glaser, 1990). For example, Guthrie (1952) suggested 
that errors should be avoided because by practicing errors, the incorrect response to a particular 
stimulus would be strengthened. Furthermore, errorless as compared to trial-and-error learning 
has been shown to be beneficial for people with memory impairments, including Alzheimer’s 
disease, schizophrenia, Korsokoff’s syndrome, and trauma (see Clare & Jones, 2008, for a 
review). One concern with generalizing from this line of empirical research, however, is that the 
benefits of errorless over errorful learning have been found primarily in specific patient 
populations and may not apply to typical learners. Nevertheless, in an experiment by 
Cunningham and Anderson (1968), worse retention was found after participants had been forced 
to guess rather than following a simple presentation of the to-be-remembered material.   
  Despite the arguments that the generation of errors impedes learning, several researchers 
have found that error generation is not detrimental to memory of subsequently learned correct 
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answers.  One way of examining the effect of errors on learning is by forcing responses for every 
item on a test, as compared to allowing participants to answer only when they so choose. Forced 
responding results in more errors than does free responding. However, on a later test of 
definition terms, using this procedure with both college undergraduates and 6th grade students, 
Metcalfe and Kornell (2007, and also see Kornell & Metcalfe, 2014) found neither benefit nor 
impairment for forced as compared to free responding. Similarly, Kang et al. (2011) found that 
forced guessing did not lead to either better or worse memory for the correct answer on a later 
retention test, either immediately or at a one-week delay. However, it is impossible to know 
whether the lack of a difference might have occurred because people in the free responding 
condition generated errors to the same extent as people in the forced responding condition, but 
did not overtly express them. It is also not known what kinds of errors were produced under the 
forced guessing procedures, and in particular, whether they were related or unrelated to the 
targets. Research based on multiple-choice quizzing prior to learning a lesson in a classroom 
setting also suggests that pretesting (which results in many errors) neither helps nor hurts 
memory for the correct information (McDaniel, Agarwal, Huelser, Roediger & McDermott, 
2011). No difference in memory was found for items quizzed on a pretest as compared to non-
quizzed items.  
In contrast to the above findings, however, there are some studies in which making errors 
helps learning. Richland, Kao and Kornell (2009) found enhanced memory for material from 
reading passages when the to-be-remembered material was tested using cued recall questions 
prior to reading the passages, even though participants did not answer these pretest questions 
correctly. Izawa (1967, 1970) has also shown that multiple incorrect retrieval attempts enhanced 
learning; producing more incorrect responses before receiving feedback led to better memory for 
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the correct feedback than did producing fewer incorrect responses. Parlow and Berlyne (1971) 
found that participants were better at learning the correct translations for foreign language words 
when they had previously made an erroneous guess, as compared to when they were exposed to 
the guesses of others. Kane and Anderson (1978) showed that generating the last word of the 
sentence, even if it was incorrect, led to enhanced performance over simply reading the sentence. 
Slamecka and Fevreiski (1983) reported a benefit, above just reading the answer, from trying 
unsuccessfully to generate it.   
Finally, in a paradigm that we will investigate here, Kornell, Hays and Bjork (2009) 
demonstrated a considerable benefit of prior incorrect guessing for subsequent learning of the 
correct answer. Participants learned weakly associated word pairs (e.g. whale-mammal, swing-
tree, together-love) for a later cued recall test. During the initial learning phase, participants 
randomly studied word pairs either in a Reading mode or Error-generating mode. In the Reading 
mode, both the cue and the target were displayed on the screen for a fixed amount of time (either 
5s or 13s). In the Error-generating mode, participants only saw the first word (the cue) for 8 s 
and had to type a guess into the computer as to what they thought the target would be, followed 
by the correct cue-target pairing displayed for 5 s. At test, given the cue, participants were 
required to produce the correct target and not the original error. Error generation led to enhanced 
retention as compared to both Reading conditions.  
In sum, it is unclear whether errors during learning hinder, enhance, or simply have no 
effect on learning. Any of these three options might be possible under different conditions, but it 
is not yet known what those conditions might be. However, studies in which there was a benefit 
of error generation used cue-target pairs that generally seemed to be meaningfully related. For 
example, the experiments in Kornell et al.'s (2009) study, which demonstrated beneficial effects, 
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used to-be-remembered materials that were weakly associated word pairs. By extension, it might 
be plausible that errors generated in response to these cues might also have been related, rather 
than unrelated, to the targets. However, in one of Kornell et al.'s (2009) experiments, no benefit 
for error-generation was found. In this case, participants guessed answers to fictional general 
knowledge questions (Berger, Hall & Bahrick, 1999) to which they could not possibly have 
known anything about the correct answers, such as, “What is the last name of the person who 
invented maladaptibility?” It is likely that the errors that people generated in this particular case 
were unrelated to the targets. Additional support for the idea that the relatedness of the errors 
might matter comes from Slamecka and Fevreiski (1983), who compared a generation-followed-
by-feedback condition to a Read condition. Judges retrospectively evaluated the relatedness of 
the errors of commission that participants had made, dividing them into those that were related 
and unrelated to the target. Related errors led to fairly high later recall, whereas unrelated errors 
and omissions led to low recall. These results suggest that the relatedness of the errors to the 
target may be an important factor in determining whether errors help or hurt recall — a 
possibility that will be investigated in the experiments that follow.  
 Finally, given that there is a conflict concerning the effects of errors in the research 
literature, it is plausible to suppose that the learners themselves might not know whether errors 
help or hurt learning. As well as exploring the conditions under which errors promote and hinder 
learning, we also investigated if, in retrospect, participants were able to accurately monitor 
whether generating errors helped or hurt their performance on the final test. This question is 
important, as metacognitive monitoring has been shown to have consequences for strategy 
selection, referred to as metacognitive control (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Thiede, Anderson, & 
Therriault, 2003).   
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Experiments 1a and 1b 
 In Experiment 1a, our aim was to replicate Kornell et al.’s (2009) findings by 
investigating if we would also find an error generation effect for memory of weakly associated 
word pairs. Participants studied word pairs in an error generation condition, and two different 
read conditions (within participants factor). In Experiment 1b, we extend upon these findings by 
utilizing unrelated word pairs, for which we hypothesized the effect would not be found. We 
present the data for these two experiments as a between participants factor.1 Therefore, half of 
the participants studied weakly related word pairs while the other half studied unrelated word 
pairs. We also tested participants’ retrospective metacognitions about their memory performance. 
Methods 
Participants. Sixty Columbia undergraduates (native English speakers) participated for 
partial fulfillment of a class requirement. Mean age was 21.8 years (SD = 6.2) and 68.3% of the 
participants were female. All participants in both experiments were treated in accordance with 
APA ethical guidelines.  
Design and Materials.  The semantic relation of the to-be-remembered materials was 
manipulated between-participants, while learning condition was a within-participants variable, 
resulting in a 2 (materials: related, unrelated) x 3 (learning Condition: read short, read long, 
error-generate) mixed design.1 
For the related materials condition, 90 weakly associated word pairs were selected from 
Nelson, McEvoy and Schreiber’s (1998) norms, closely following Kornell et al.’s (2009) word 
                                                
1 Because we did not know whether our experiment would replicate the findings of Kornell, et al. (2009), 
we assigned the related materials condition to the first 18 participants, a condition that is most similar to 
their experiment. After the first set of data on 18 participants was collected in 3 days, and it was clear that 
we were replicating the earlier results, we randomly assigned participants to both materials conditions 
beginning the following week. 
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pair selection criteria. Given the first word, approximately 5% of participants in Nelson et al.'s 
(1998) experiment produced the target as the first associate. Specifically, Forward Associative 
Strength was between .05-.054, and Backward Associative Strength was 0. Each word was a 
minimum of 4 letters long. For the unrelated materials condition, new materials were selected 
because in a pilot experiment, cued recall performance was at floor for random word pairs 
created from the Nelson et al. (1998) norms. Therefore, unrelated word pairs were created from 
Pavio, Yuille and Madigan’s (1968) norms. One hundred eighty words were selected (to create 
90 word pairs) with relatively high concreteness ratings (6.38-7 on a 1-7 scale) and were a 
minimum of 4 letters long. Words were randomly assigned as cues or targets and three 
independent coders checked that the so-constructed list of 90 unrelated word pairs contained no 
accidentally related word pairs. Mean concreteness ratings were the same for the words assigned 
as cues and targets (M = 6.77). For each of the between-participant conditions, the 90 word pairs 
were randomized into three sets of 30 items, which were rotated through each of the study 
conditions creating three unique counterbalanced conditions.  
Procedure. This experiment had four phases: learning, distractor, final test, and 
metacognitive judgment. During the learning phase, 30 word pairs were presented in each of the 
three conditions (90 word pairs in total). Word pairs were presented in a random order by 
MediaLab and DirectRT software (Jarvis, 2004). In the error generation condition, participants 
were only given the first word (cue) of a word pair with a text box displayed below. Participants 
were instructed to think of what the second word might be and to type their response into the text 
box as quickly as possible. After 5 seconds, the text box disappeared and the correct cue-target 
pairing appeared, with both the cue and the target remaining on the screen for 5 s. In the read 
short condition, both the cue and the target were presented together on the screen for 5 s, while in 
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the read long condition, both the cue and target were presented for 10s. These conditions were 
presented in a random order (not blocked). The computer made a soft clicking sound to alert the 
participant to the presentation of the next word pair. Before the study phase began, participants 
read instructions on a computer screen. The experimenter also discussed the procedure verbally 
and ensured that participants understood the task before proceeding. During the instructions, the 
experimenter expressed that it was extremely difficult to correctly guess the correct target word, 
to prevent the participants from being discouraged by poor performance on the task. They were 
instructed to remember the target answer presented by the computer for the later memory test, 
not the word they had produced. During the distractor phase, participants played a visuospatial 
computer game for 6 minutes before continuing to the final test.  
The final test was self-paced and consisted of all 90 word pairs presented during the 
learning phase. For each word pair, the cue was displayed on the screen with a textbox below. 
Participants were instructed to type in the correct target for each cue, and to provide a guess if 
unsure of the correct answer. The order of presentation was randomized.  
Following the final test, participants made a metacognitive judgment of their performance 
on the final test based on the initial learning conditions. Instructions were as follows: “There 
were three conditions in this experiment: A) together –short: both words displayed on the screen 
for 5s, B) together – long: both words displayed on the screen for 10s; C) separate: the first word 
presented separately (5s) before both words were displayed (5s). Which condition helped you 
learn the word pairs the best for the final test? Please order the conditions in order from which 
condition led to the BEST to WORST memory on the final test.” Participants subjectively ranked 
the conditions by entering the associated letter from the best to the worst for memory. We 
avoided the word 'error' in the Error -generation condition because we thought its negative 
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connotation might bias the judgment. Following a demographic questionnaire, all participants 
were thanked and debriefed.  
Results 
Two coders checked for, and corrected, spelling and typographical mistakes on the 
original and final test before analysis of the data. A strict coding rule was followed in which if 
the tense (i.e. “clean” vs. “cleaned/cleaning”) or form of speech (“dust” vs. “dusty”) was 
different from the target, that item was coded as incorrect. However, in the few instances in 
which an item was made plural (“reptile” vs. “reptiles”), it was coded as correct.  
Learning phase performance.  Participants in the related materials condition guessed 
correctly on 3% of the error generation trials (SD = .03), while no participant in the unrelated 
materials condition ever correctly guessed the target word during the learning phase (M = .00, 
SD = .00). All further results reported for the error generation condition are only from items that 
were initially answered incorrectly during the learning phase, therefore, 97% of the trials for the 
related materials condition, and 100% of the trials for the unrelated materials condition.2 
Final cued recall test correct performance.  As is shown in Figure 1.1, correct final 
performance was higher for related materials (M = .64, SD = .19) compared to unrelated 
materials (M = .21, SD = .15), [F(1, 58) = 91.34, MSE = .09, p < .001, ηp2 = .61]. There was a 
main effect of learning condition: Error generation lead to the highest proportion correct on the 
cued recall test, [F(2, 116) = 13. 71, MSE = .01, p < .001, ηp2 = .19]. However, this main effect 
was qualified by an interaction with type of Materials. Although error generation enhanced 
                                                
2 Of these errors, 90% were errors of commission for related materials, and 91% for unrelated materials, 
t< 1. Reported data is including errors of omission as well, since correct performance on the final cued 
recall test was not statistically different as a function of prior error type, F < 1. For Experiment 1c, 96% 
of errors were errors of commission, and a similar pattern of results for final test performance as a 
function of prior Error type was found. Therefore, results are not conditionalized upon error type, with the 
exception of Latent Semantic Analysis (as it could only be computed for generated errors). 
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Experiments 1a  1b Experiment 1c 
retention for related materials, it did not enhance performance for unrelated materials, [F(2,116) 
= 32.21, MSE = .01, p < .001, ηp2 = .36]. Within related materials, the error generation condition 
led to the highest proportion correct on the cued recall test (M = .74, SD = .17), which was much 
higher than recall in the read long condition (M = 62, SD = .23), [t(29) = 5.14, SE = .02, p < 
.001]. The read short condition led to the lowest proportion correct (M = .54, SD = .21), which 
was significantly lower than performance in the read long condition, [t(29) = 3.54, SE = .02, p < 
.01], and error generation condition, [t(29) = 7.37, SE = .03, p < .001]. With unrelated items, 
however, the read long condition led to the highest correct performance (M = .25, SD = .19), 
which was significantly better than both the read short condition (M = .21, SD = .16), [t(29) 2.09, 
SE = .02, p < .05], and the error generation condition (M = .17, SD = .12), [t(29) = 3.26, SE = 
.02, p < .01]. Though the trend favored the read short condition over error generation, 
performance between these two conditions was not significantly different from one another, 







































Figure 1.1. Cued Recall Performance. Correct performance on final cued recall test as a function 
of Learning condition and Materials for both Experiment 1ab (between-subjects) and Experiment 
1c (within-subjects) 
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 Reaction times. Reaction time (RT) data on the final test were analyzed as a function of 
Accuracy on the final test (correct versus incorrect), learning condition (read short, read long, 
error generation) and materials (related, unrelated); see Table 1.1 for means.  Reaction time data 
are reported in the current section for completeness, but will be discussed only in the General 
discussion. Several participants did not have data in all cells in the RT data, and as a result, the  
degrees of freedom  in the analyses given below differ from those given in the basic data for this 
experiment.  
 Overall, correct responses  (M= 4.44 s, SD = 1.13) were faster than incorrect responses 
(M = 8.63 s, SD = 4.06), [F(1, 54) = 67.65, MSE = 21.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .56]. Collapsed over 
accuracy, participants were slowest to respond to items on which they had previously generated 
an error (M = 7.35 s, SD = 3.43), in comparison to the read short items (M = 6.20 s, SD = 2.68) 
and read long items (M = 6.04 s, SD = 2.40), [F(2, 108) = 13.38, MSE = 4.20 p < .001, ηp2 = .20.] 
There was an interaction between accuracy and learning condition, whereby the difference in RT 
   Correct on Final Test  Incorrect on Final Test  
   Read Short Read Long 
Error 
Generate  Read Short Read Long 
Error 
Generate  
           
Experiments 1a 1b          
 Related (1a)  3.86 (1.01) 3.93 (0.78) 4.27 (0.92)  7.83 (4.79) 7.26 (3.43) 10.10 (5.26)  
           
 Unrelated (1b)  4.85 (2.15) 4.57 (1.09) 5.14 (1.99)  8.27 (4.06) 8.42 (4.26) 9.87 (5.78)  
           
Experiment 1c          
 Related  3.58 (1.25) 3.77 (0.92) 4.19 (1.33)  6.72 (2.96) 6.93 (2.96) 8.00 (3.830)  
           
 Unrelated  4.81 (1.83) 3.82 (1.24) 4.07 (1.46)  6.66 (2.71) 6.44 (2.16) 8.25 (2.91)  
           
    
Table 1.1 
Mean reaction time in seconds (s) for responding on the final test as a function of Learning condition, Material 
condition, and Accuracy on the final cued recall test. Standard deviations are provided in the parentheses. 
 13 
between items answered incorrectly and correctly on the final test was larger in the Error 
generate conditions than in the read conditions, [F(2, 108) = 6.30, MSE = 3.79, p < .01, ηp2 = 
.10]. Lastly, the relatedness of the materials did not result in differences in RTs. Response 
latencies were similar regardless of materials condition. There was no difference between related 
and unrelated materials, [F = 1.06, ηp2 = .02] and materials did not interact with any other factor.  
 Error persistence. In the error generation conditions, more of the initially incorrect 
responses intruded on the final test for unrelated materials (M = .20, SD = .20) as compared to 
related materials (M =.05, SD = .06), [t(58) = 4.05, SE = .04, p < .001].3  
 Metacognition. Data from 52 subjects were included in the metacognitive analyses: 26 
from the related materials condition and 26 from the unrelated condition. Exclusions were due to 
participant failure to assign a distinct metacognitive ranking to each of the three Learning 
conditions. In order to compare performance and metacognitive rankings for each participant, the 
three conditions were assigned a value on a 0 to 2 scale. The Learning condition on which the 
participant performed best on the final test was assigned a 2; the condition on which he or she 
performed second best was assigned a 1; and the worst was given a score of 0. The same 
assignment was done for individuals’ metacognitive ratings of the three Learning conditions.  
                                                
3 Though more of original errors were produced on the final test for unrelated materials in Experiment 1a, 
this does not necessarily mean that those in the related materials condition were not capable of retrieving 
their original error. Anecdotally, during the debriefing, many participants in the related materials 





 As can be seen from Figure 1.2, participants believed that they performed the best in the 
read long condition. They also believed that they had done poorly in both the error generation 
condition and read short condition, regardless of whether the materials were related or unrelated 
pairs. For the unrelated materials these metacognitive rankings were approximately correct. 
However, the participants' beliefs were radically wrong for the related materials; they failed to 
realize that generating errors greatly facilitated recall under this condition, even having just 
experienced the enhanced test performance.  
To assess this pattern statistically, metacognitive mean ranking was contrasted with 
performance mean rankings within each learning condition. These comparisons were done 
separately for each of the two materials conditions using the Wilcoxon non-parametric test in 
lieu of the standard paired-samples t-test. Rankings for performance and metacognitive 
Figure 1.2. Metacognitive Data for Experiments 1a1b (between-participants). Mean ranking of Learning 
conditions based on correct performance on the final cued recall test and subjective metacognitive judgments. 
The condition with the highest proportion correct or subjectively rated the best was assigned a score of a 2. 
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judgments (within materials condition) are not independent, so these contrasts could not be 
computed. First, for the items in the read short condition for related materials, there was a trend 
for actual performance (M = .35, SD = .56) to be worse than subjectively reported (M = .65, SD = 
.70), [z = 1.86, p = .06].  For the read long condition, the mean metacognitive ranking was higher 
(M = 1.50, SD =  .65) than the actual performance ranking (M = .92, SD = .61), [z = 2.78, p < 
.01]. Most interestingly, however, in the error generate condition participants mistakenly 
believed that their performance was very low (M = .85 SD = .88) when it was actually high (M = 
1.73, SD = .55), [z = 3.45, p < .01]. Within unrelated materials, participants’ retrospective 
metacognitive rankings were very close to actual performance rankings; there was no difference 
in mean subjective metacognitive ranking compared to actual performance rank for any of the 
comparisons, [zs < 1.16].  
Discussion 
First, consistent with Kornell et al.'s (2009) study, we showed that producing an error for 
semantically related materials led to enhanced retention. We also found that error generation did 
not enhance recall if the materials were completely unrelated. The semantic relation between the 
cue and target appeared to be critical in determining whether error generation enhanced memory 
or not.  
A question one might ask is whether participants were behaving similarly when they 
generated their errors and responded to the feedback in the related and unrelated materials 
conditions. Perhaps participants were simply guessing randomly and were not sufficiently 
engaged in the unrelated materials condition, while they were employing all of their efforts to try 
to generate the answers in the related materials condition. An attentional explanation has been 
proposed in other error-correction paradigms (c.f., Butterfield & Mangels, 2006, Butterfield & 
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Metcalfe 2006; Fazio & Marsh, 2008). Izawa (1967, 1970) has specifically argued that previous 
errors led to increased learning because of enhanced attention to the corrective feedback. 
Motivational/attentional differences between conditions might be revealed by the nature of their 
guesses. By examining the nature of the error responses that the participants produced, we could 
potentially gain some insight into whether participants had behaved substantively differently 
when they generated their errors in the related and unrelated materials conditions. 
Latent semantic analysis. We obtained estimates of the relation between the cues and 
the generated errors by using Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA). LSA (see, Landauer, Foltz, & 
Laham, 1998) is a method of extracting the contextual-usage meaning of words by statistical 
computations applied to a large corpus of text (Landauer & Dumais, 1997). The aggregate of 
appearance all words provides a set of mutual constraints that is thought to determine the 
similarity of meaning of words to one another, given as a cosine. Using LSA (through http://cwl-
projects.cogsci.rpi.edu/msr/, see Veksler, Grintsvayg, Lindsey, & Gray, 2007), it was found, as 
expected, that the mean relatedness between the cues and targets was higher for related materials  
(M = .27, SD = .04), than unrelated materials (M = .05, SD = .01), [t(58) = 30.46, SE = .01, p < 
.001]. 
Of more interest, we used LSA to investigate the association between the cue and the 
error that was generated, in the related and unrelated materials conditions. As is shown in Table 
2, when presented with the cue, participants produced errors that were related to the cue in both 
the related and the unrelated material conditions. The mean relatedness between cue and 
generated error for related materials (M = .28, SD = .09) was numerically only slightly higher 
than for unrelated materials (M = .25, SD = .09), [t(58) = 1.92, SE = .02, p = .056]. To see if 
participants in the unrelated materials condition altered their guessing strategy as the experiment 
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progressed, the mean association values for the first 15 items was compared to the last 15 items.  
There was no difference in the LSA values using this method (M = .24, SD = .09) than the earlier 






















 As previously noted, we hypothesized that the relation between the generated error and 
the target might be a critical factor in determining whether error generation would be beneficial 
for memory (a possibility that we could also investigate using LSA). Table 2 shows the mean 
association values for the Target-Error relation as a function of materials. Indeed, as 
hypothesized, the error was more related to the target in the related materials condition, (M = .20, 
SD = .04) than in the unrelated materials condition (M = .08, SD = .02), [t(58) = 17.16, SE = .01, 
p < .001].  
Metacognitive illusion. The metacognitive results were particularly interesting. These 
retrospective judgments were taken after the participants had already had considerable 
      Cue to Error   Target to Error 
 Materials  Correct Incorrect  Correct Incorrect 
        
Experiment 1a 1b       
 Related  0.30 (.07) 0.25 (.10)  0.20 (.04) 0.19 (.10) 
        
 Unrelated  0.25 (.11) 0.25 (.08)  0.09 (.04) 0.07 (.02) 
        
Experiment 1c       
 Related  0.27 (.09) 0.27 (.07)  0.20 (.13) 0.22 (.06) 
        
  Unrelated   0.34 (.17) 0.32 (.06)   0.06 (.05) 0.06 (.02) 
Table 1.2 
Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA, a semantic relation tool) enabled analysis of the semantic relatedness 
between the Errors produced by the participant to the provided Cues and Targets. Mean cosine values (the 
measure provided by LSA) between word pair comparisons are presented below. Higher values indicate a 
higher degree of semantic relation. These data are presented as a function of Materials condition and 
Accuracy on the final cued recall test. 
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experience with the task. Although participants had just completed the final test moments earlier, 
those participants in the related materials condition did not realize that the error generation 
condition led to the best performance. Instead, they erroneously thought the read long condition 
was the most beneficial for memory of the target items, and they failed, rather dramatically, to 
appreciate the benefits of making errors. Furthermore, though performance in each of the three 
different learning conditions varied greatly between materials, the metacognitive ratings were 
similar. Comparing materials conditions, it is clear that although the performance follows two 
distinct patterns, the metacognitive ratings do not vary as a function of material relatedness. The 
metacognitive rankings for each Learning condition (read short, read long, and error generation) 
revealed no statistical differences across Materials, [zs < 1.60, ps  > .13]. Therefore, although we 
see a performance boost from error generation for related materials, participants’ rankings are no 
different from the unrelated condition. This metacognitive illusion, it seems, is stable and 
unaffected by the participant's own contradictory experience with the results of the learning task.  
Experiment 1c 
The third experiment endeavors to replicate the results of Experiments 1a1b in a within-
participants design, in order to address more fully the question of why there was a benefit of 
error generation only when the cue and target were semantically related. One motivation for a 
within-participants design was that randomly mixing the presentation of related and unrelated 
materials would ensure that participants were cognitively engaging in similar tasks when 
generating an error, and would obviate the small difference in response to the cues seen in the 
LSA analysis in Experiments 1a1b. In the within-participant design, when only the cue was 
displayed on the screen, the participants could not know whether the forthcoming target would 
be related or unrelated to the cue. If the lack of memorial benefit for unrelated materials from 
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error generation was an artifact only of overall lack of engagement or attention, then a benefit of 
generating errors might occur for both related and unrelated materials in the within-participants 
design. Only after error generation could participants know the relation of the cue and the target. 
Conversely, if we replicated the results seen in Experiment 1a1b, this would provide stronger 
evidence that the semantic relation between the error and the target is central in determining 
when error generation helps memory. 
Method 
Participants. Thirty native English speaking Columbia students participated for credit. 
Mean age was 20.7 years (SD = 3.3) and 50% of the participants were female. 
Design and materials. A 2(materials: related, unrelated) x 3(learning: read short, read 
long, error generation) within-participants design was used. Forty-five of the related material 
items and 45 of the unrelated material items from Experiment 1a1b were randomly selected for 
use in the current experiment for a total of 90 word pairs. For both related and unrelated 
materials, three sets of 15 word pairs were created and counterbalanced over participants so that 
each word pair was assigned to each of the three learning conditions equally. 
Procedure.  The procedure was the same as the previous experiments. During the study 
phase, item presentation order was randomized, and, as noted above, items were preassigned to 
conditions, which were counterbalanced between participants. Order of item presentation was 
also randomized on the final cued recall test. All instructions were identical to those given in 
Experiment 1, with the exception of the metacognitive ratings. Since the current design had six 
conditions, all six were described in the instructions before the participants ranked them in order 




Learning phase performance.  Participants did not correctly answer any of the 
unrelated materials in the error-generate condition during the Learning phase. They correctly 
guessed 3% of the related targets (SD = .03). All results from the error generation condition 
excluded the trials for which participants guessed correctly on the initial test. 
Final cued recall test performance. As is shown in Figure 1, there was an interaction 
between Learning condition and Materials. Error generation led to the highest correct 
performance for related materials, but it did not lead to benefits with unrelated materials, 
[F(2,58) = 7.89, MSE = .01, p < .01, ηp2 = .92]. Pairwise comparisons showed that error 
generation for related materials led to higher correct recall (M = .70, SD = .20) than both read 
short, [t(29) = 4.08, SE = .04, p < .001], and read long, [t(29) = 2.51, SE = .04, p < .05], which 
did not differ from one another, [t(29) = 1.61, SE = .04, p = .12]. There were no significant 
pairwise differences in performance for the three Learning conditions with unrelated materials 
(all ts < 1). As expected, participants remembered more of the correct targets for the related 
compared to unrelated materials, [F(1, 29) = 344.32, MSE = .03,  p < .001, ηp2 = .21]. Though 
qualified by the interaction, there was a main effect of Learning condition such that error 
generation lead to the highest correct performance overall, followed by read long and read short, 
[F(2,116) = 4.06, MSE = .03, p < .05, ηp2= .12]. 
Reaction times. Table 1 shows mean RTs as a function of accuracy on the final cued 
recall test, Learning and Material conditions. Only 16 participants had observations for all cells. 
Overall, items answered correctly (M = 3.69 s, SD = 1.34) were produced more quickly than 
incorrect items (M = 7.04 s, SD = 2.84), [F(1, 29)=69.18, MSE = 14.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .71]. 
When participants previously made an incorrect guess in the error generation condition (M = 
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6.01 s, SD = 2.25), their subsequent RTs on the final cued recall test were slower than in the read 
short (M = 5.02 s, SD = 2.19) and in the read long conditions (M = 5.08 s, SD = 1.82), [F(2, 58) 
= 6.88, MSE = 5.31, p < .01, ηp2 = .19]. Items in the error generation condition that were 
answered incorrectly on the final test took longer to produce than items answered correctly, [F(2, 
58) = 5.73, MSE = 4.35, p < .01, ηp2 = .17]. The relatedness of the materials did not lead to 
differing response latencies on the final test, [F< 1], nor did Materials interact with any other 
factor. 
Error persistence. For unrelated materials, 15% of responses on the cued recall test were 
original errors that persisted from the Learning phase to the final test. The original errors 
persisted only 7% of the time for related materials, [t(29) = 3.65, MSE = .01, p < .01].  
Metacognition. Performance for each condition was ranked from best to worst. Because 
there were 6 conditions in the experiment, the best condition for each participant was assigned a 
score of 5 and the worst was assigned 0. As can be seen in Figure 3, the error generation 
condition for related materials was objectively the best condition for retention, (M = 4.38, SD = 
.87). However, this condition was only given a mean metacognitive ranking of 2.53 (SD = 1.54), 
[z = 4.12, p < .001]. Conversely, although read long for related materials was subjectively 
believed to have produced the best performance (M = 4.53, SD = 1.03), in fact, it most often led 
to worse performance than error generation (M = 3.72, SD = 1.07). Noticeably, the metacognitive 
ranking and performance ranking for read long are not aligned, [z = 3.34, p < .001]. Finally, 
mean metacognitive judgments indicated that participants subjectively believed that the unrelated 
read long condition led to better performance than it actually did (Mmetacognitive = 2.37 SD = .82, 
Mperformance= 1.37 SD = .97), [z = 3.48, p < .01]. No significant differences were found between the 
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mean metacognitive judgments and performance rankings for the three other cells (related – 




 Latent semantic analysis. The results from the LSA mirror those of Experiments 1a 1b, 
despite many participants being excluded from the analysis due to lack of observations in every 
cell (See Table 2). Participants generated errors that were related to the cue regardless of 
Materials condition. The mean relation value between the cue and error was slightly higher for 
unrelated materials (M = .32, SD = .06) than for related materials, (M = .26, SD = .05) [t(29) = 
5.06, SE = 0.01, p < 001], though at the time of generating the error, the participant could not be 
aware of the subsequent relation to the target, and, this effect is in the opposite direction in 
Experiment 1. The semantic relatedness of the errors to the cues provided support for the idea 
that participants were engaged and truly generating reasonable errors, even for the unrelated 







Read Short Read Long Error 
Generation 
Read Short Read Long Error 
Generation 











Figure 1.3. Metacognitive Data for Experiment 1c (within-participants). Mean ranking of Learning conditions 
based on correct performance on the final cued recall test and subjective metacognitive judgments. The condition 
with the highest proportion correct or subjectively rated the best was assigned a score of a 5. Second best was 
assigned a score of 4 and so forth, while the worst condition was assigned a 0. 
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target (M = .06, SD = .02) as were errors generated for related materials (M = .21, SD = .06), 
[t(29) = 17.51, SE = 0.01, p < .001].   
Discussion 
Experiment 1c replicated the findings of Experiments 1a 1b:  Error generation led to 
memorial benefits over both reading conditions, but only for related materials. For semantically 
related word pairs in both experiments, there was enhanced retention for the correct response 
when participants had made a prior incorrect response, as compared to when they had just read 
the word pairs. For the unrelated materials, there was no such benefit of incorrect guessing in 
either experiment. If the benefit from producing an error was due to the effort or engagement 
during generation itself, then there should have been some benefit from incorrect guessing for 
the unrelated materials in Experiment 1c. Insofar as items were randomized, participants could 
not have been aware of what the next trial would be. Therefore, the processing was the same 
across related and unrelated conditions during the act of generating the error itself. The results 
from the LSA substantiated this lack of difference during error generation. Therefore, it appears, 
that the differential benefits of error generation between related and unrelated materials began at 
the time of target feedback.  
General Discussion 
These results support the idea that semantic closeness is a critical factor in determining 
whether an error will or will not help learning. One framework consistent with these results is the 
Osgood (1949) transfer surface, which captured all transfer of learning relations that were known 
at the time of publication. In this surface, similarity between intralist stimuli (cues) is plotted 
against similarity of intralist responses (targets). Of importance is how these two factors interact 
to produce positive transfer, or conversely, interference. This framework would predict that 
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positive transfer will result if the error and target were related. It is only when the two responses 
(the error and the target) are unrelated that negative transfer or interference should be produced. 
For the error generation condition for related materials in our experiments, LSA showed that 
errors were highly similar to the correct targets. Therefore, Kornell et. al’s (2009) materials and 
our related materials condition conformed to Osgood’s (1949) A-B A-B’ situation. The 
erroneous answer produced in this context facilitated learning of the correct answer, B’. 
Conversely, the LSA ratings showed that our unrelated materials condition conformed to 
Osgood’s (1949) A-B, A-C situation. The errors, in that condition, were unrelated to the correct 
targets, and produced no memory benefit. In fact, there was a slight suggestion of error-related 
interference. Compared to related materials, unrelated materials led to more of the original errors 
persisting in the final test. Additionally, in the first experiment, correct item recall was worse in 
the error generation condition than in either of the Read long or read short conditions. 
Since the time of Osgood, two possible explanations have emerged for why this 
relationship between the error and the target might be important. One explanation is that making 
a related error helps form a richer, more elaborate network with the cue and the error, as 
compared to an unrelated error. In terms of Levels of Processing, encoding in a deeper, more 
elaborative manner is beneficial for future retrieval (Craik  & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 
1975). Through elaborative processing, by producing a guess and forming an elaboration based 
on a “deep” or semantic level, retention is enhanced above “shallow” processing. Error 
generation of a related item might be an elaboration thereby making the target more meaningful.  
Though one might engage in elaborative processes for unrelated materials, this elaboration might 
be in vain. For example, if provided with the word “attack”, when one tries to generate a 
response, one will presumably think about what it means, and erroneously generate “dog”.  
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When the related target, “defend” is displayed, the connection is clear and one can draw a more 
elaborate and meaningful relationship than simply when one sees “attack-defend.”  One can 
imagine an attack dog defending his doghouse, defending oneself against an attacking dog, or 
both. This richer, more elaborate encoding method should help retention. However, if the correct 
answer is something unrelated to attack, such as bicycle, it is more difficult to form a meaningful 
connection or elaboration between the cue, error and target. Additionally, Carpenter (2009) and 
Carpenter and DeLosh (2006) have argued that elaboration is less likely to occur when reading 
as compared to active retrieval.  
Along similar lines, during error generation, one might activate a variety of related 
concepts that provide a more elaborate, richer memory trace, consistent with Spreading 
Activation theories of memory (e.g. Collins & Quillian, 1972). Since there is more information 
that could potentially activate the correct target, this elaborative structure could aid recall (e.g. 
Anderson, 1983). Carpenter (2011) suggests that retrieval helps in activating semantically related 
information above restudy. In other recent work, Grimadli and Karpicke (2012) found error 
generation benefits only for semantically related items, a finding consistent with the results 
presented in the current paper. Conversely, when participants’ errors were constricted by 
providing the first few letters of the error (e.g. tide – wa____), an error generation benefit was 
not obtained. The authors interpret their results as favoring a spreading activation view, that is 
when an error is committed, concepts that are related to the target are activated and enhance 
learning (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1974). 
An episodic mediator hypothesis is a second potential explanation for why the relation 
between the error and the target may be important in determining whether errors benefit recall of 
the correct target. Under some circumstances, the error itself may serve as a mediator, or 
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secondary link, between the cue and the target. It has been shown that previous retrieval attempts 
can serve as an intermediary cue in target retrieval (Soraci et al., 1999), and can facilitate recall 
(Pyc & Rawson, 2010). The latter study found beneficial effects of the episodic link, however, 
only when it could both be retrieved at time of test, and when it elicited the target item.3 In the 
current paradigm, it seems more likely that a word that is related to the target might serve as an 
effective mediator than would one that is unrelated to the target.  
These two hypotheses— ‘error as an elaboration’ and ‘error as an episodic mediator’— 
are not mutually exclusive. ‘Error as an elaboration’ suggests that because of enhanced 
processing at encoding from an active (elaborative processing) or passive (semantic activation) 
process, the correct target will be remembered better when an error is generated than with simple 
study. In addition, even at retrieval, those concepts that were previously activated might lead to 
enhanced recall of the correct target. On the other hand, the ‘error as an episodic mediator’ 
hypothesis suggests that recalling the original error itself, and not just the surrounding semantic 
landscape, can act as a secondary cue to retrieve the target. Therefore, it is possible that both of 
these effects can occur simultaneously.   
The RT data are readily interpretable within the 'error as an episodic mediator' 
hypothesis. Participants took longer to produce a response on the final test for the error 
generation condition as compared to the read long and read short conditions. When attempting to 
retrieve the correct target, the incorrect guesses might have served as a secondary link that 
introduced a second step into the retrieval process. This second step would require additional 
time, thereby leading to longer RTs.  Even for unrelated materials, if one retrieved the original 
error and tried to use it as a mediator, the response time would still be longer due to the 
additional, unsuccessful labor in trying to find the correct retrieval path to the target.   
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The RT data could also be interpreted within the error as an elaboration view, though, 
insofar as exploring the elaborations that were set up at encoding could also be assumed to take 
time. A number of semantic activations models predict longer RTs with a higher number of 
associated concepts (see ACT-R and Fan-effect: Anderson, 1974; Anderson & Reder, 1999). 
These models could also predict that participants’ RTs would be slower for the error generation 
conditions as a result of response competition between the original generated error and the 
correct target.   
Finally, in both experiments the metacognitive data show a stable illusion, whereby 
participants were not aware that error generation was helpful for remembering related word 
pairs. It is, perhaps, not surprising that committing errors during learning is typically seen in a 
negative light. As Bjork (1994) stated, “Errors made during training are generally not viewed as 
opportunities for learning, but rather, as evidence of a less-than-optimal training program.” (pg. 
299). It is surprising, however, that even moments after completion of the criterion test, 
participants were not aware that error generation was beneficial for related materials. This 
finding is particularly interesting as global retrospective estimates of performance (GREPs) have 
been shown in other experimental situations to make use of information acquired during the 
criterion test to help inform judgments (c.f., Hertzog, Price & Dunlosky, 2008). Retrospective 
judgments, therefore, have been shown to be more accurate than predictions of performance (see 
Pieschl, 2009 for a review). For this reason, it is surprising that there seems to be such a large 
disconnect between subjective performance rankings and actual performance. However, there 
may be ways to eradicate the metacognitive mismatch if people's attention, at time of test, were 
more clearly focused on the effect that the various experimental conditions had on memory 
performance (c.f. Benjamin, 2003; King, 1991; Zimmerman, 2000). 
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Though currently we cannot make any claims in regards to potential mechanisms driving 
the subjective bias against errors, this bias is still of great interest. There are several possible 
explanations for the error generation metacognitive illusion. One is that participants simply had a 
bias against believing that errors are beneficial. A second explanation is that participants relied 
on an “ease of processing” heuristic (see Koriat & Ma’yan, 2005; Winkielman, Schwarz, 
Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003), or more specifically, “easily learned, easily remembered” (Koriat, 
2008; Miele & Molden, 2010). There have been a number of experiments in which how easily 
stimuli are processed influences judgments of how well information is learned (e.g., Carpenter & 
Olsen, in press; Koriat, 1997; Koriat, 2008; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Rawson & Dunlosky, 
2002; Rhodes & Castel, 2008). Since error generation might not have seemed as easy as reading 
the answer (perhaps at both retrieval and at encoding), participants would be underconfident in 
this strategy. Furthermore, if participants were also generating the error as a mediator, despite its 
beneficial effect on retention, the presence of another potential competitor could have driven 
down performance estimates.  
  From an educational standpoint, the findings of the current reported experiments are of 
relevance for two reasons. First, we have shown that when the materials are related, even when 
that relation is very small (low associates, not high associates) generating an error and receiving 
corrective feedback is better for learning than simply studying.  Though more research must be 
done to understand the exact mechanisms behind the error generation effect, the present results 
suggest that guessing should be encouraged, even if the result is an error. Rarely will the 
question and answer be so far removed that the learner cannot make a meaningful connection 
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between the one’s error and the correct answer.4 
  The second point of interest to educators comes from the metacognitive monitoring results 
and will be further addressed in Chapter 3. It is clear that even immediately after completion of 
the criterion test, participants were not aware of which study strategy was best for learning. It is 
plausible that learners rely on these types of global retrospective judgments when deciding what 
learning strategy to use. It has been shown that monitoring has consequences for metacognitive 
control, or the regulation of learning (Finn, 2008; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Son, 2004; Son & 
Kornell, 2008; Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Stone, 2000, also see Metcalfe, 2009).  Thus, it seems 
unlikely that the learner, without further training of his or her metacognition, will implement this 
highly effective learning strategy. 
 
                                                
4 However, some caution is needed in implementing this recommendation, given that errors may have 
detrimental effects for memory-impaired individuals, as Clare and Jones (2008) have reviewed. It is not 
yet known if error generation, in instances where the errors are related to the targets, as studied here, will 


















































Exploring Memorial Mechanisms of the Error Generation Effect 
Mistakes are inevitable. We constantly strive to avoid errors, but are they always harmful 
for learning? Under certain circumstances, making an error prior to learning the correct answer 
helps compared to simply studying the correct information (Grimadli & Karpicke, 2012; Hays, 
Kornell, Bjork; 2012; Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012; Kornell, Hays & Bjork, 2009; Slamecka & 
Fevreiski, 1983). In Chapter 1, we introduced a standard version of the error generation 
paradigm. In the error generation condition, a cue word is presented on the screen, and one must 
guess what she thinks the correct answer will be. After producing an incorrect response, the 
correct target is presented for study. However, in the error-free or “read” condition, both the cue 
and target are displayed simultaneously, and there is no opportunity to commit an error. On a 
later memory test, memory for the correct target response is greater after generating errors during 
learning than reading the word pairs without committing an error (Grimadli & Karpicke, 2012; 
Hays, Kornell & Bjork, 2012; Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012; Kornell, Hays & Bjork, 2009; 
Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983). Additionally, other studies have shown that multiple incorrect 
retrieval attempts led to better memory for the correct feedback than producing fewer incorrect 
responses (Arnold & McDermott, 2012; Izawa 1967, 1970). 
To date, the learning advantage of error generation seems to be found only when the error 
is semantically related to the target. In previous research, when the error is unrelated, 
performance was no better than that in the error free conditions (Grimadli & Karpicke, 2012; 
Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012, Chapter1). Furthermore, the more semantically similar the error is to 
the correct answer, the more likely the individual is to give the correct target at final test 
(Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983). Though a number of explanations have been put forth as to why 
generating an error for related materials potentiates learning of the correct response (c.f. Arnold 
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& McDermott, 2012, Grimadli & Karpicke, 2012; Hays et al., 2012; Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012; 
Kornell et al., 2009; Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983), one common thread is the semantic relation 
or mediation between the error and the correct answer, which we will refer to as the semantic 
mediation hypothesis. The semantic mediation hypothesis concerns the degree to which the error 
can semantically connect to the correct answer, and this is what determines the effectiveness of 
the error committed. Based on several semantic network models, the closer two items are in 
semantic space (i.e. the more related they are), the more activation one item will receive as a 
result of activation of the other item (Anderson, 1983; Collins & Quillian, 1972; Collins & 
Loftus, 1974, Neely 1976, Posner & Snyder, 1975). For example, the word “finger” is thought to 
activate concepts that are related, such as “hand,” more than unrelated concepts such as 
“hillside”. This enhanced activation attributable to priming from related information makes an 
item more likely to be recognized or recalled later due to increased accessibility (Neely, 1976; 
Posner & Snyder, 1975; also see Higgins, 1996). Therefore, when a person is presented with a 
prompt such as ‘wrist-   ?  ’,  producing the error ‘finger’ should activate concepts related to 
'finger' including the concept 'hand.'  The activation of the error 'finger' would be expected to 
make 'hand' more available and more accessible in future memory processing, as compared to the 
case in which  'finger' was not generated.5 
 Additionally, a semantically related item, which here is the error, can serve as a mediator 
(prompt, cue, link, or stepping-stone) leading from the cue to the target and enhance memory for 
the correct target (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992; and see Carpenter 2011; Pyc & Rawson, 2010). 
                                                
5 In addition, by constricting errors by providing the first few letters of the error (e.g. tide – wa____), 
these related, albeit constrained errors did not lead to better memory above reading (Grimadli & 
Karpicke, 2012). These results were interpreted to indicate that when generating an error, part of the 
benefit is derived from “searching” and subsquently activating more related information. Here, by 
restrictng the search, one does not obtain the benefit of generating an error. 
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However, an unrelated error should not provide such a stepping-stone. It would either not 
activate the correct target or it could guide the learner down the wrong semantic path (away from 
the correct target) and ultimately not benefit recall.  
Along similar lines, one can draw a connection to the Gestalt Principle of Good Fit, or 
‘Prägnanz’ which is based upon regularity, orderliness, uniformity, and degree of coherence 
(Koffka, 1947; Todrovic, 2008). According to the associative symmetry hypothesis of Gestalt 
Psychology, new items are incorporated into a novel holistic representation (Kahana, Howard & 
Polyn, 2008), which benefits from a more unified and orderly unit. It could be expected then that 
unrelated errors should decrease the orderliness of the representation, and hurt memory more 
than simply studying (See Anderson & Bower, 1973 for more on Gestalt theories of memory). In 
sum, the data to date are consistent with the Semantic Mediation hypothesis; only semantically 
related errors, and not unrelated errors, have resulted in enhanced target recall for error 
generation as compared to error-free study (Grimadli & Karpicke, 2012; Huelser & Metcalfe, 
2012).6  
The Current Paradigm: Polysemous Triplets 
In the current chapter, our aim was to explicitly test the semantic mediation hypothesis 
and investigate the importance of the error-target semantic connection for the error generation 
effect. To do so, we used materials that led to two different types of errors: semantically related 
errors, with a direct semantic link between the cue and target, and unrelated errors that led to the 
                                                
6 However, in these previous experiments, one important commonality was that the cue and the to-be-
remembered target were unrelated, thereby obfuscating the direct role of the error-target relationship. In 
other words, not only was the error unrelated to the target, but the cue was also not semantically linked to 
the correct target. It could be that generating an error does not provide a memorial benefit if the target is 
not related to the cue, as a meaningful context might be needed into which to incorporate the target (see 
Kornell, 2014). Therefore, the resulting design of this experiment begins to examine the role of the error 
itself. 
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incorrect semantic domain. If the error generation effect depends upon the error itself being 
semantically related to the correct answer, we should not see an error generation effect for these 
incongruent errors. Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of the experimental materials and design.  
Participants were instructed to learn word-triplets where the second word of each triplet 
was polysemous (having more than one meaning, such as PALM). Half of the triplets presented 
were congruent, so that all three words were in the same semantic space (wrist – PALM – hand). 
The other half of the triplets was incongruent, so that one meaning was inconsistent with the 
other two. In other words, the first word of the triplet was of the alternate (non-semantically 
related) meaning of the polysemous word (tree – PALM– hand).7  
                                                
7 Participants did not view both the congruent and incongruent versions of each word-pair. The 
comparison is merely to demonstrate the difference between congruent and incongruent word pairs.   
ERRORS HELP LEARNING 
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Experimental Materials & Procedural Overview: Example of a Congruent and Incongruent triplet in a 
Reading and Error Generation condition. Both experiments used a 2 (Learning Condition: Reading, Error 
Generation) x 2 (Materials: Congruent, Incongruent) within-participants design. Each participant studied 
triplets in each of the four conditions in a random order. Experiment 2 was identical to experiment 1, 
with the exception that participants also provided wither original error on the final test. (NOTE: 
Participants did not read and generate an error for the same triplet during learning, nor did they see the 
congruent and incongruent version of the same item. The present example is to simply highlight 























































































Figure 2.1.  
 
Experimental Materials & Procedural Overview. Example of a Congruent and Incongruent triplet in read 
and error generation conditions. Both experiments used a 2 (Learning Condition: read, error generation) x 
2 (Materials: congruent, incongruent) within-participants design. Each participant studied triplets in each 
of the four conditions in a random rder. Experiment 2b was ide tical to Experiment 2a, with the 





Triplets were presented in two different Learning conditions: read or error generate. For 
read trials, participants viewed the triplet on the screen (e.g. wrist – palm – hand) for 12 seconds. 
For the error generation condition, participants were given 7 seconds to generate a response to 
the double-word cue (e.g., wrist – palm-   ?   ), and then the correct triplet (wrist – palm – hand) 
was displayed for 5 seconds. If semantic relation is key to the error generation effect, generating 
an error (such as finger) would be a semantic mediator to the correct target (hand). However, this 
would not be the case for incongruent triplets (tree – palm-   ?   ), if the correct answer was again, 
hand. In this case, however, we expected that people would generate an error consistent with the 
alternate meaning of palm because it would be that meaning that would be evoked by the concept 
tree. The incongruent error would lead down the wrong semantic path (such as coconut, 
sunshine, beach) not to the correct target, ‘hand’. If semantic activation or mediation is key, then 
generating an error in this later case should not enhance memory above reading, and perhaps, 
lead to decreased learning of the correct response. 8 
Method 
Participants. Forty Columbia University undergraduate students (MAge = 22.25, SD = 
7.3), 62.5% Female, native English speakers) participated for partial fulfillment of course credit.  
Materials and Procedure.  This was a 2 (materials: congruent, incongruent) x 2 
(learning: read, error generation) within-participants design, creating four unique conditions: 
                                                
8 This is predicted in part by Marcel (1980)’s priming work which found slower RTs on a lexical 
deciciosn task for the third word when the triplet was incongruent (e.g. tree-palm-hand) compared to 
congruent triplets (wrist-palm-hand). This suggests that concepts that are more closely associated with the 
congruent meaning of the polysemous word receive enhanced activation, and while alternate meanings 
are suppressed or inhibited (Marcel, 1980). 
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[congruent: error generation], [congruent: read], [incongruent: error generation], and 
[incongruent: read].  
Polysemous words and related associates were selected from the Nelson, McEvoy and 
Schreiber’s (1998) norms or generated by the author. Triplet creation followed the format used in 
Marcel (1980), whereby the polysemous word was always the second (middle) word of the 
triplet, and the target was randomly selected from the associates. Sixty items were randomly 
selected from the resulting pool of 100 items. Within each set of 60 items, 15 items were then 
also randomly assigned to sets, which was counterbalanced between learning condition and 
materials, ensuring items were seen in both congruent and incongruent cases in read and error 
generation learning conditions between participants. A second random set of 60 items was 
selected, and also followed the same counterbalancing procedure.9 
During the learning phase, participants were shown 60 triplets in a random order 
presented via MediaLab and DirectRT software (Jarvis, 2004), therefore, participants were not 
aware of what the learning condition (read, error generation) or materials (congruent or 
incongruent) for each trial. Triplets in the read condition were displayed on the upper left hand 
side of the screen for 12 s. For error generation, the cue (consisting of the first two words of the 
triplet) was displayed on the screen for 7 s (WRIST – PALM – ____ ). During this time, 
participants typed their prediction for the target (the third word of the triplet). After 7 s, correct 
feedback (the full triplet, WRIST – PALM – HAND) was displayed for 5s before the next item 
appeared. Participants read instructions on the screen before beginning this task, and the 
                                                
9 We confirmed that the relation between these materials (congruent, incongruent) the polysemous word 
and congruent or incongruent target semantic relation (using Latent Semantic Analysis, LSA, (Landauer, 
Foltz, & Laham, 1998) did not differ (Ms = .23, SDs = .02) [t<1], and our congruent materials were had a 
higher degree of relationship between the cue and the target (M =.33, SD =.08) than incongruent items 
(M = .18, SD = .11) t (59) = 85.56, SE = .02, p < .001. 
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experimenter supervised and explained the procedure during sample trials. Following the 
learning phase, there was a short (6min) visuospatial filler before the self-paced cued recall test 
of all 60 triplets presented in a random order.  
Results and Discussion 
Original errors. Participants produced errors in most of the error generation trials, with 
slightly more errors for incongruent materials (M = .95, SD = .06) than congruent (M = .91, SD = 
.07), [t(39) =2.54, SE = .02, p < .05]. Trials in which participants guessed the target correctly 
were excluded from all further analyses.  
We also wanted to ensure that errors on congruent items were related to the target, while 
for incongruent items, errors would not be semantically related. For example, if the to-be-
remembered target was ‘HAND’, ‘finger’ might be the error generated for a congruent item, 
(wrist – palm -    ?    ). Alternatively, an incongruent triplet (tree–palm-    ?    ) might lead to the 
error ‘coconut.’ Though predicted from priming results using similar materials (Marcel, 1980), 
using Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) (Landauer at al. 1998, Landauer & Dumais, 1997) we 
confirmed that generated errors for the incongruent items (M = .14, SD = .05) were less related to 
the target than were the congruent items (M = .18, SD =.05), [t (39) = 3.07, SE = .01, p < .05]. 10 
Cued recall performance. A 2 (materials: congruent, incongruent) x 2 (learning: 
reading, error generation) repeated measures ANOVA was computed on the mean correct 
performance on the final cued recall test. As is shown in Figure 2.2 there was an error generation 
benefit; generating an error during learning led to improved memory for the target (M = .65, SD 
= .21) over simply studying the triplets, (M = .55, SD = .18), [F (1, 39) = 16.43, MSE = .03, p < 
                                                
10 As a manipulation check, we also analyzed the data excluding the trials in which errors were highly 
related to the target in the incongruent case (one standard deviation above the mean; 11% of error trials). 
The pattern of results remained the same even with these trials excluded, and therefore, we did not 
exclude these trials from the current analyses. 
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.001, ηp2 = .30]. The benefit of error generation over reading was significant in the congruent 
condition [t(39) = 2.64, SE = .03 p < .02], as expected from past research, but it was also 
significantly beneficial in the incongruent condition [t(39) = 3.97, SE = .03 p < .001]. 
Additionally, overall congruent materials led to higher rates of correct recall on the final test (M 
= .64, SD = .21) over incongruent materials (M = .57, SD = .19), [F (1, 39) = 12.70, MSE = .02, p 
< .01, ηp2 = .25].  
Original errors were only incorrectly reported as the target response for 9% of the 
incorrect cued recall responses, and did not differ as a function of materials (Mcongruent = .09, 
SD=.11; Mincongruent = .09 SD = .09 [t < 1], 
 
Figure 2.2. (Experiments 2a and 2b). Cued Recall. Correct performance on final 
cued recall test as a function of Learning and Materials conditions.  
 
Error generation during learning led to higher rates of correct target recall for both 
congruent and incongruent materials than did simply reading the material. Error 
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Discussion 
Our results do not wholly support the semantic mediation hypothesis, as we still found an 
error generation effect for incongruent materials. A close semantic relationship between the error 
and to-be-remembered information is not the only condition in which generation of errors 
benefited memory. Therefore, we propose an additional hypothesis to account for these results: 
Episodic Recollection.  
A critical element might be the participants’ episodic memory of the original learning 
event (see Hintzan, 2011; Jacoby & Wahlheim, 2013; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013). Previous 
work has shown that when a meaningful link (either an image, semantic bridge, story, etc.) was 
generated to connect two unrelated words, the most important predictor for correct recall was the 
ability to remember one’s own generated link (Dunlosky, Hertzog & Powel-Moman, 2005). 
Perhaps the error is serving as an episodic mediator, linking the cue and the target and bringing 
the learner back to the original learning episode. For example, when the target is incongruent, a 
participant might think: “I recollect that my original response to ‘tree-palm-    ?    ’ was 
‘coconut,’ but this was incorrect and very different from what the correct answer was supposed 
to be… I need to go down the other path; PALM can also refer to a part of one’s body, so the 
correct answer is HAND.”  That said, a similar episodic line-of-thinking might be used for 
congruent items, though it would result in a straightforward retrieval path.  For example, given 
the cue ‘wrist-palm-    ?    ’ the participant might think: “I remember that my original response 
was ‘finger’ which had a similar meaning to the correct answer. It was close to correct, but not 
quite the same... The correct answer is HAND.” Note that in both the congruent and incongruent 
instances, getting to the original episode and remembering the error is an important step for 
producing the correct answer. Furthermore, according to the Episodic Recollection hypothesis, if 
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there is a breakdown in episodic memory, and one cannot rely upon the original error to guide 
one to the correct answer, error generation should not be more helpful than errorless-learning.  
Experiment 2b 
To test the Episodic Recollection hypothesis for the error generation effect, Experiment 
2b was identical to Experiment 2a except that in addition to asking participants for the correct 
answer at final recall, participants were also prompted to provide their original error. If the 
recollection of the error episode was used in retrieving the correct response regardless of 
semantic relation to the target, the participant should have also recalled the error itself at the time 
of target retrieval.  
Method 
Participants. Forty Columbia University undergraduate students (Mean Age = 19.4 (SD 
= 1.5), 52.5% female, all native English speakers) participated for course credit.  
Materials and Procedure. The materials and design were the same as those used in 
Experiment 2a, though there was a slight procedural difference on the final cued recall test. For 
each cue, participants provided the correct target and their original error if they made one 
previously. If it had been a reading trial where no original error was made, participants typed 
“NA” for not applicable.  Participants either saw “CORRECT ANSWER?” or “ORIGINAL 
RESPONSE?” above the cue, depending on the trial type. Order of trial type (being prompted for 
the correct answer first versus the original response first) was randomized and did not lead to any 
differences in cued recall performance, [F<1].  
Results and Discussion 
Original errors. Rates of correctly guessing the correct response were similar between 
materials (Mcongruent = .08, SD = .08; M incongruent= .05, SD = .06), [t(39) = 1.55, SE = .02, p = .13]. 
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These trials are excluded from all other analyses. For the resulting included trials, errors 
generated during learning are more related to the congruent target (M = .18, SD =.05) than the 
incongruent target (M = .15, SD =.05), [t (39) = 2.13, SE = .01, p < .05].  
Cued recall performance. As in Experiment 2a, we conducted a 2 (materials: congruent, 
incongruent) x 2 (learning: read, error generation) repeated measures ANOVA on proportion 
correct on the final cued recall, the means of which are displayed in Figure 2.2. Overall, 
participants remembered the target more often for congruent items (M = .60, SD = .21) than for 
incongruent items (M = .53, SD = .22), [F (1, 39) = 10.47, MSE = .01, p = .002, ηp2 = .21], but 
importantly, generating errors still resulted in better target recall (M = .64, SD = .21) than simply 
reading (M = .50, SD = .22), [F (1, 39) = 37.92, MSE = .02, p < .001, ηp2 = .49]. Furthermore, 
the benefit for generation of errors over reading was evident for both congruent and incongruent 
materials [t(39) = 7.12, SE = .02 p < .001, t(39) = 3.36, SE = .02 p < .01], respectively), though 
slightly larger for the congruent condition, as shown by the significant interaction, [F (1, 39) = 
5.24, MSE = .01, p =.028, ηp2 = .12]. As this interaction was not present in Experiment 2a, we 
compared performance between experiments for each of the four conditions. The only difference 
trending toward significance between these two experiments is the congruent read condition is 
slightly higher in Experiment 2a than Experiment 2b [t (78) =1.86, SE = .05, p = .067. All other 
comparisons are non-significant, [ts <1].  
Recall of original errors and conditional analyses. The primary interest was whether or 
not recollection of errors was crucial for error correction. Overall, participants remembered their 
original errors on over half of the trials for both congruent (M = .60, SD = .24) and incongruent 
materials (M = .64, SD = .25), with memory for prior errors being slightly higher in the 
 42 
incongruent condition, [t(39) = 2.16, SE = .02, p < 05]. Overall, 10% of incorrect responses on 
the final test were original errors (M congruent = .09, SD = .17, M incongruent = .10, SD = .14), [t < 1]. 
Still, was target recall higher when the original error was recalled versus not? First we 
examined proportion correct as a function of if the error was recalled or not for both material 
types, and these data are presented in Figure 2.3.  
 
As expected by the episodic recollection hypothesis, when the original error was 
produced, correct performance on the target recall was 56% greater (M = .71, SD = .24) than 
when the error could not be recalled (M = .45, SD = .27) [F (1, 38) =  33.47, MSE = .01, p = 
Figure 2.3. Conditional Cued Recall. Cued recall performance conditional upon recall of original error 
for Congruent and Incongruent items, compared to Read conditions (Experiment 2b).  
 
When the error could be recalled, memory for the correct answer was greater than when the original error 
was not reproduced on the final test. When the error was not recalled, correct performance was no better 
than the read condition for congruent items, and even worse than the Reading condition for incongruent 























.002, ηp2 = .47]. Though congruent answers were recalled more (M = .63, SD = .27) than the 
incongruent target responses (M = .53, SD = .25), [F (1, 38) = 10.59, MSE = .04, p < .01, ηp2 = 
.22], this effect is qualified by an interaction between Materials and Error recall, [F (1, 38) = 
6.09, MSE = .05, p =.018, ηp2 = .14]. When the error was recalled, correct memory for the target 
was nearly identical in the congruent (M =.71, SD =.26) and incongruent conditions (M  =.70, SD 
= .23), t < 1). However, when participants could not recall the original error, correct recall of the 
target was higher for congruent items (M = .54, SD = .28) compared to incongruent items (M = 
.35, SD = .27), [t(39) = 3.45, SE = .05, p < .01].  
Notably, when the errors were not recalled at the final test, there was no benefit from 
error generation (M = .45, SD = .27) as compared to the read condition (M =.50 SD = .22), F <1.  
However, not recalling the error in the incongruent condition had more severe consequences than 
for congruent materials, (significant interaction: [F(1,39) = 7.31, MSE = .05, p = .01, ηp2 = .16]). 
When the original error was not recalled for congruent items, performance in the error generation 
condition (M = .54, SD = .28) was not better than in the read condition (M =.51, SD = .20), [t<1]. 
However, for incongruent items, error generation (M = .35, SD = .27) was significantly worse 
than in the read condition (M = .49, SD = .23), [t(39) = 2.74, SE = .05, p < .01].  
General Discussion 
The findings presented here offer support for the episodic recollection hypothesis: One’s 
error contributes more than simply activating semantically related materials, and the error itself 
can serve as an episodic memory link. When there is a breakdown in episodic memory and one 
cannot rely on the original error to guide one to the correct answer, error generation is no more 
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beneficial than simply studying.11 These findings are consistent with recent work on recursive 
reminding, as discussed by Hintzman (2004, 2011) and elaborated upon by Jacoby and 
Wahlheim (2013) (and also Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013). In Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013) when 
asked to recall the most recent item of a category, category items that had been previously 
studied were also reported to come to mind. Furthermore, when the previous item was retrieved 
along with the more recent item, retrieval was enhanced compared to when no recollection was 
present. Wahlheim and Jacoby (2013)’s findings support that upon activation of the original 
episode, other elements associated with this episode are also accessed. If the error itself can be 
recollected, it should serve as an additional episodic retrieval cue or a reminder of the target. As 
serial position is also preserved during recursive reminding (e.g., Hintzman, 2011; Jacoby & 
Wahlheim, 2013) and episodic remembering in general (c.f., Conway, 2009; Howard & Kahana, 
2002; Kahana et al. 2008), this episodic memory affords the learner to know which was her error 
compared to the correct target. In sum, this episodic recollection account of error generation 
draws upon Tulving’s (1983) seminal encoding specificity principle: the context for which a cue 
was encoded is the optimal retrieval cue. Hence, if the error is aiding one to retrieve the original 
context or episode, correct memory should be also enhanced by being able to episodically 
remember your mistake.12 
                                                
11 While we recognize that not recalling an incongruent error leads to worse performance than reading, 
here, we note that the his difference is perhaps due to a higher probability of correctly guessing the target 
as compared to guessing the target for  (cont) incongruent items as Latent Semantic Analysis predicts. We 
also recognize an alternate explanation, that even when one cannot recall her original error, the prior 
activation of related concepts aided in correct recall of congruent targets, yet this activation could not 
spread to the correct target for incongruent items. Regardless, even if semantic mediation might aid when 
the error (episodic mediator) is not present, it cannot be the sole mechanism driving the error generation 
effect. 
12 However, if episodic recollection is key to the error generation benefit, then it might be best to be 
cautious in unilaterally prescribing error generation as an effective study method. Episodic recollective 
processes could be problematic for some, in which case, generating errors would not be helpful. (cont.)  
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In conclusion, this learning benefit of generating errors is not simply a result of how close 
the semantic connection is between the error and correct answer, and Semantic Mediation cannot 
be the only explanation for the error generation effect. Support was found for the episodic 
recollection hypothesis, as recalling the original error did not interfere with the ability to recall 
the correct response. In fact, error retrieval during test enhanced correct recall, even for 
incongruent materials. This suggests that an error can serve as a mnemonic episodic bridge to the 
original learning episode. Instead of simply overriding and erasing mistakes, it is important to 
utilize them as a stepping-stone or an episodic mediator to arrive at the correct answer. To learn 








                                                                                                                                                       
In fact, our findings parallel with research on the lack of an error generation effect for those with episodic 
memory deficits (Baddelely & Wilson, 1993; Clare & Jones, 2008; Hanman & Squire, 1995; Komatsu et 
al., 2000; Kalla, Downes, & Van den Brock, 2001; Tailby & Halsam, 2005). Such individual differences 






































Metacognition of Error Generation: Stable or malleable bias? 
 
What strategies are best for learning? Although it has been shown that knowledge about 
strategies for learning increases from childhood to adulthood, it is clear that adults are not always 
aware of which strategies lead to the relative best performance (see Bjork, Dunlosky & Kornell, 
2013 and Veenman, 2010 for reviews). This understanding or knowledge of a study strategy’s 
effectiveness is a critical aspect of the broad-reaching construct of metacognition, which can be 
defined as thinking or reflecting upon one’s own thoughts or abilities (Flavel, 1979; Nelson & 
Narens, 1990; Metcalfe & Dunlosky, 2009).  
The current question of interest regarding the error generation effect is a metacognitive 
one: Are learners able to accurately metacognitively monitor (detect/assess) that making an 
error or guessing incorrectly can be an extremely effective study tool? In Chapter 1 (Huelser & 
Metcalfe, 2012), we demonstrated a metacognitive illusion, as moments after completing the 
criterion test, participants failed to rate error generation as best for performance. These findings 
were surprising, as postdictions (retrospective) have been shown to be less difficult than 
predictions (prospective) (c.f., Hacker, Bol, Horgan, & Rakow, 2000; also see Pieschel, 2009 for 
a review). Therefore, the goals of the current chapter are to begin to exclude some possible 
explanations of the bias against error generation as an effective learning strategy, in addition to 
investigating if this bias is stable or if it can be correctly updated. 
Underconfidence in Error Generation as an Effective Learning Strategy  
 In Huelser and Metcalfe (2012), learners failed to accurately assess strategy effectiveness 
on an aggregate, or global level, which is one key component of many metacognitive models 
(Nelson & Narens, 1990, Hertzog, Price & Dunlosky, 2008; Schraw, 1994; Schraw & Moshman, 
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1995; Winne, 1996; Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2000).13 Yet, how does one monitor 
performance, especially in aggregate? It has been suggested that learners do not only use task 
specific cues when making metacognitive judgments, but also rely on more stable metacognitive 
knowledge (Flavel, 1979; Winne, 1996), particularly at the global level (c.f. Hertzog, Price & 
Dunlosky, 2008). As metacognitive knowledge can be influenced by motivation, task-difficulty, 
and self-knowledge (Hertzog et al. 2008; Flavel, 1979), one potential source of bias may be 
based upon negative apriori (pre-experimental) beliefs about errors. Despite doing well on the 
final test, learners might be biased that making errors is negative, and therefore, overrule or fail 
to update their metacognitive knowledge about errors and learning. Studies have shown aversive 
effect associated with making an error (e.g. Hajcak & Foti, 2008), and “[t]he experience of 
failure is associated with negative emotion, lowered self-esteem, reduced intrinsic motivation, 
and lower expectancies of future success, particularly when the failure is attributed to internal 
causes.” Chase, 2012, pg. 2). Furthermore, on a measure of error attitudes (Error Orientation 
Questionnaire), errors were associated with guilt and fear (Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 
1999). Therefore, it is not surprising one might believe that errors are harmful for learning. If one 
experiences the errors as failures and is unable to attend to the corrective feedback as a result of 
distress or nervousness due to making the errors, then error generation might not be beneficial 
for learning (Zhao, 2011). Even within the classroom, Tulis (2013) recently showed that teachers 
                                                
13 There are different methods to measure global monitoring  in Huelser and Metcalfe (2012) participants simply 
ranked learning conditions. However, subjective strategy preference can also be assessed by estimates of how many 
items (or a proportion of items) are answered correctly. In the current set of experiments, we refer to these global 
performance assessments as Global Retrospective Estimates of Performance (GREPs). The terminology in the 
literature is mixed; several have used,“Global Differentiated Postdiction” (c.f. Dunklosy & Hertzog, 2000, Hertzog 
et al. 2008; Schraw, 1994), while others in the Self-Regulated Learning Literature also refer to item-monitoring as 
cognitive evaluations and global as metacognitive evaluations (Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Greene & Azevedo, 2007) 
Others have used the terms “on-line” versus “off-line” respectively (Van Hout-Wolters, 2000; Veenman, 2005). 
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rarely encouraged error risk taking and were not likely to suggest mistakes as opportunities for 
learning. 
Despite the potential pre-experimental incorrect metacognitive knowledge that might 
contribute to the underconfidence effect, we still are not sure if the inaccuracy is only at the 
global level (e.g. How did I perform on this test, overall?), or also present during item-by-item 
monitoring (e.g. Did I answer this question correctly?). These item-specific retrospective 
confidence judgments are also a critical aspect of metamemory models as a form of 
metacognitive monitoring at retrieval (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Dunlosky, Serra & Baker, 2007; 
Hertzog et al., 2008). There are several experiments, spanning various materials, which suggest 
learners often excel at making item-level confidence judgments with considerable accuracy 
(Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001; Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2000; Hertzog et al, 2008; Higham, 2002; 
Matvey, Dunlosky, Shaw, Parks, & Hertzog, 2002; Schraw, 1994; Veenman, 2010). However, if 
metacognitive monitoring is inaccurate on an item-level, then it is likely that global 
metacognitive monitoring would also be inaccurate, especially if item-by-item judgments are 
used to inform global judgments (as seen in Dunlosky & Hertzog 2000; Hertzog et al., 2008). Put 
differently, if the learner (falsely) believes she is answering several of the items from the error 
generation condition incorrectly, we would expected her to be underconfident when assessing the 
effectiveness of error generation on later memory performance. A critical first step in 
understanding why learners are not aware of the error generation benefit is to measure 
confidence of performance accuracy on an item-by-item level; if the underconfidence lies here, it 
is likely also to lie at the global level.  
Beyond simply understanding on which level—item-by-item and/or global—
underconfidence occurs, it is of great research interest to explore possible mechanisms by which 
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underconfidence can be reduced or eliminated. In other words, can one discover that generating 
errors can be beneficial for memory without explicitly being told that her performance was best 
in the error generation condition? This is an important question, as Veenman (2010) reiterates 
from a historic overview that 96% of metacognitive instructions in the classroom are implicit. 
Teachers did not explicitly describe the metacognitive strategies used in the classroom, nor why 
they were beneficial for learning (Veenman, deHaan & Dignath, 2009).  
There is evidence both to support and contradict that implicit updating of metacognitive 
knowledge is possible. Kornell and Bjork (2009) have shown a robust metacognitive “stability 
bias”, such that learners often fail to adjust their metacognitive knowledge to correctly predict 
future performance. This view is also supported by Winne and Hadwin’s (1998) model of self-
regulated learning, in which stable metacognitive beliefs are resistant to updating based on 
performance feedback (see also Greene & Azevedo, 2007). Additionally, it has been suggested 
that due to high cognitive load demands, such complex content knowledge is not possible to 
update without considerable guidance (Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, 2011), or unless learners are 
explicitly informed of which strategy was best for learning (Tullis, Finely, & Benahamin, 2013). 
Overall, even if learners are accurate on an item-level, on a global level a learner might not be 
able to retrospectively aggregate her performance on various items while also remembering the 
learning condition in which each of the items originally appeared (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & 
Kleinbolting,1991; Schraw & Niefeld, 1998; Winne, 1996). Faced with such a demanding task, 
learners might be prone to various sources of bias in making global judgments (e.g. Kahneman, 
2003; Manis, Shedler, Jonides, & Nelson, 1993).  
However, other work has shown that metacognitive calibration between performance and 
monitoring can be improved by having learners provide arguments against their answers (Koriat, 
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Lichtenstien and Fischhoff, 1980). For example, by providing grade-point incentives (Schraw, 
Potenza & Nebelsick-Gullett, 1993), offering financial incentives (Epley & Gilovich, 2005) and 
even by guided long-term training over the course of the semester (Nietfiled, Cao & Osborne, 
2006) studies have shown that metacognitive knowledge can be updated. Thiede and Anderson 
(2003) also showed that summarizing after a delay enhanced metacomprehension accuracy. In 
addition, Dunlosky and Hertzog (2000) and Benjamin (2003) both demonstrated that learners can 
become more accurate between performance and future learning predictions at the global level 
without explicit guidance (also see Hertzog et al., 2008). After taking a test, participants made 
more accurate global predictions about which group of materials (e.g. high frequency vs. low 
frequency words, Benjamin, 2003) or which study strategies (e.g. Imagery vs. Rote Rehearsal, 
Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2000) would lead to the best performance. Critically, in Dunlosky and 
Hertzog (2000) the test itself might not have led to these updated predictions; participants also 
monitored performance on the criterion test by making item-by-item confidence judgments. The 
subsequent global predictions might not have been as accurate without item-level monitoring. 
Benjamin (2003) further provides evidence of the importance of item-by-item confidence 
judgments for updating metacognitive knowledge by manipulating overt item-level performance 
monitoring, which led to more accurate recognition predictions for a second set of words. When 
participants did not make the item-level judgments during the first set of words, their predictions 
for the second set remained incorrect. A critical point of updating metacognitive knowledge 
seems to be on an item-level during the criterion test. As these item-by-item judgments have 
aided in calibration for other materials and study strategies, perhaps this fine-grained monitoring 




In the present experiment, we address the following two questions: 1) Are learners 
accurate in their item-level monitoring of performance? 2) Does this item-level monitoring have 
consequences for strategy knowledge updating? The procedure was nearly identical to Huelser 
and Metcalfe (2012), except that in addition to attempting to provide target answers during the 
final cued recall test, half of the participants assessed accuracy for each item on a 0-100 
confidence judgment scale (confidence monitoring condition). Those in the control group (no-
monitoring condition), provided the correct answer, without overtly making item-level 
confidence judgments. After the cued recall test, participants gave a global retrospective estimate 
of performance (GREP), for which they estimated the proportion of items they answered 
correctly for each of the three learning conditions (read short, read long, and error generation). 
By having half of the participants make item-by-item confidence judgments for each item 
on the final test, we can determine if participants’ underconfidence of the memorial benefit of 
making errors is driven by an inability to know on an item-level which questions are being 
answered correctly (or incorrectly). If participants are able to make accurate item-by-item 
judgments, but are inaccurate on a global level, we can infer the metacognitive breakdown is not 
at the item-level monitoring for performance, but instead occurs sometime during the transition 
from item-level to global. In addition, monitoring might have implications for one’s overall 
assessment of error generation as a learning strategy. If participants are aware of accuracy on an 
item level, our manipulation of overt-performance monitoring could lead to enhanced global 
calibration. If so, this would indicate that simply assessing performance for each item aids in 
updating metacognitive knowledge of error generation as an effective learning strategy.  
Method 
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Participants. Thirty-six Columbia University students participated to partially fulfill a 
class requirement (77% female, M age = 21.14, SD = 6.90). Half of the participants were 
randomly assigned to the control group (no item-level monitoring at test) and the remaining half 
to the confidence monitoring group (those who made item-by-item confidence assessments). 
Materials and design. Sixty weakly associated word-pairs (.05-.054 forward associative 
strength) from Nelson, McEvoy and Schreiber’s (1998) were randomly selected from Huelser & 
Metcalfe (2012). Monitoring on the final cued recall was manipulated between participants, 
while learning condition was manipulated within participants, resulting in a 2 (monitoring group: 
no monitoring (control), confidence monitoring) x 3 (learning condition: read short, read long, 
error generation) mixed design. Materials were randomly assigned to sets and counterbalanced 
within learning condition, ensuring items were distributed among the three within-participant 
learning conditions equally.  
Procedure. Participants began the experiment by completing sample trials of each of the 
three learning conditions. For read short, the intact word pair (cue-target) was displayed on the 
screen for 5 s, while for read long, the intact word pair was displayed for 10 s. For error 
generation, the first word of the word pair (cue) was displayed for 5 s with a textbox below, into 
which participants typed a guess of what they thought the correct second word (target) would be. 
Following 5 s, the correct word pairing (cue-target) was displayed for 5 s. Participants were 
instructed to remember the correct target (“what the computer told them”) for the later test, not 
their response. In addition to all instructions on the computer screen, the experimenter verbally 
confirmed the instructions with the participant, and added, “The task is very difficult. Regardless 
of what you type, please really try your best to remember the correct second word for later.” 14 
                                                
14 This is briefly discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Learning condition items of read short, read long and error generation were randomized (not 
blocked).  Following the Learning Phase, there was a 6 minute set of visuospatial tasks 
consisting of assorted puzzles.   
The Cued Recall Phase differed slightly depending on the between participants condition 
assignment. In the no monitoring (control) condition, participants were instructed to type the 
correct target in response to the displayed cue on the screen (self-paced, no time restriction). To 
move to the next trial, participants hit the “enter” key, and there was an interstimulus interval of 
750 ms before the next cue was displayed. Cues for all 60 items were displayed in a random 
order. The procedure was nearly identical for the confidence monitoring condition, though in 
addition to providing the target, participants also made a confidence judgment of the accuracy of 
their response using a 0-100 Scale [0 = Sure Incorrect, 100 = Sure Correct]. Participants read 
instructions explaining the additional task prior to the cued recall test. After attempting to 
provide the correct target (self-paced), the cue remained on the screen with the additional prompt 
“Confidence? 0-100” displayed above. Participants typed their corresponding confidence 
judgment (self-paced) before the following cue was displayed. No performance feedback was 
given.  
Following the Cued Recall Test, all participants made a Global Retrospective Estimate of 
Performance (GREP) on the final cued recall test for each of the three learning conditions. 
Participants were asked to indicate what percentage (0-100%) of items they answered correctly 
for items previously displayed in each of the three learning conditions: “In the first part of the 
experiment, you studied word pairs in three different ways. Sometimes both words were 
displayed on the screen together for 5s (Together Short), other times both words were displayed 
together for 10 seconds (Together Long). In other instances, the first word was displayed 
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separately from the second word (and you typed a response) before the correct pairing was 
displayed (Separate). Think about how well you remembered the correct second word for each of 
these three learning conditions. Please enter the percentage you think you answered correctly 
within each of these three different learning conditions.” The conditions were renamed 
“Together Short, Together Long, and Separate” to avoid usage of “Error Generation” due to 
concerns that the word “error” might bias participants’ responses. Following estimates of 
performance, participants were also asked to briefly explain why they believe they did the best in 
the condition they specified.  
Results 
Initial test correct guessing. Participants correctly guessed the target on 3% of the error 
generation trials (SD = .04), and there was no difference between participant groups [t (34) = 
1.34, SE = .01, p = .19]. These correct trials were excluded from further analyses.  
 Cued recall performance. As is shown in Figure 3.1, there was a main effect of learning 
condition, [F (2,68) = 20.61, MSE = .01, p < .001, ηp2 = .38] such that participants remembered 
Figure 3.1. (Experiment 3a) Cued Recall. 
Mean proportion correct on cued recall as a function of item monitoring condition during cued 
recall (between participants: no monitoring, confidence monitoring) and learning condition 
(within participants). There was a significant error generation effect for both groups, and this 






























the correct target more often in the error generation condition (M = .78, SD = .19) than the two 
read conditions (M ReadLong = .65, SD = .18, M ReadShort =.60, SD = .19).  Post-hoc tests showed 
that error generation resulted in higher performance than read long [t(35) = 5.86, SEM = .03, p < 
.001] and read short [t(35) = 4.03, SEM = .03, p < .001] and that read long resulted in slightly 
better performance than read short recall [t(35) = 2.07, SE = .02, p = .046]. There was no effect 
of, or interaction with monitoring condition [F< 1, F (2, 68) = 1.54, MSE = .01, p = .23, ηp2 = 
.04].  
Item-by-item confidence judgments. The item-by-item confidence ratings provide 
insight to whether participants are aware of their performance on an item-level. We only present 
item confidence ratings for the confidence monitoring condition, as the no monitoring condition 
(control) did not make these ratings. These means are displayed in Figure 3.2. First we will 
assess calibration, or absolute accuracy between performance and item-confidence judgments. 
For each participant, the mean confidence ratings for all trials within subject learning condition 
Figure 3.2. (Experiment 3a: Confidence Monitoring Group).  Cued Recall and item-by-item 
scores. Mean proportion correct on cued recall (left panel, solid bars) compared to mean item-by-item 
confidence judgments (right panel, striped bars). Item-by-item judgments were similar to cued recall 






















































was computed, and subsequently compared to the mean accuracy of target recall for each of the 
three conditions. The pattern of mean item-by-item confidence ratings is very similar to that of 
actual correct performance. There was a main effect of learning condition on item-by-item 
confidence [F (2, 34)= 24.31, MSE = .13, p < .001, ηp2= .59], such that participants had the 
highest mean confidence in the error generation condition (M = .76, SD = .18), followed by read 
long (M = .57, SD = .21) and read short (M = .51, SD = .22), mirroring the main effect of 
learning condition from cued recall performance patterns.  
Correlations between performance and item-by-item confidence. We also conducted 
Pearson correlations to see how participants’ cued recall score was related to mean confidence 
across subjects for each of the three learning conditions. These correlations confirmed that higher 
mean confidence ratings for each learning condition were positively correlated with cued recall 
performance [r read short (18) = .90; r read long (18) = .92;  r error generation (18) = .91, ps < .001]. 
Learners also knew specifically which items they answered correctly or incorrectly. 
Relative accuracy was assessed by computing a gamma correlation for each participant. A 
perfect gamma correlation score of +1.0 corresponds to a perfect positive relationship where all 
high confidence items are answered correctly, and all low confidence items are answered 
incorrectly (see Nelson (1984) for further discussion of gamma analysis). The overall mean 
gamma was .88 (SD = .14). This correlation did not differ as a function of learning condition, (M 
gamma read short = .87, SD = .22, M gamma read long = .83 SD = .17, M gamma error generation = .90, SD 
= .11), [F < 1]. 
Global Retrospective Estimates of Performance (GREPs). GREPs, the mean ratings 
people gave after completing the task of how well they had learned in each condition, are 
presented in Figure 3.3. A 2 (monitoring group) x 3 (learning condition) mixed ANOVA 
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revealed an interaction between learning condition and monitoring group [F(2,68) = 5.99, MSE = 
03, p < .01, ηp2 = .15]. As was found in our previous experiments (see Chapter 1), when there 
was no monitoring, read long was judged to lead to the best cued recall learning (M = .61, SD = 
.20) over read short (M = .47, SD = .22) and error generation (M = .42, SD = .23)  [t (17) = 3.25, 
SE = .04, p = .005, t (17) = 2.83, SE = .07, p = .011, respectively]. In contrast, in the crucial 
condition in which participants made item-by-item confidence judgments, the pattern of GREPs 
was different. In this case, they believed that error generation enhanced cued recall performance. 
Their GREPs were highest in this condition, and were significantly greater than in the read short 
condition (M = .63, SD = .26)  [t (17) = 2.51, SE = .07, p = .023] though the difference between 


















































Figure 3.3 (Experiment 3a). Global Retrospective Estimates of Performance. Mean 
Global Retrospective Estimate of Performance (GREPs) as a function of monitoring group 
(between participants) and learning condition (within participants). Participants in the 
confidence monitoring group gave higher mean GREPs for the error generation condition than 
those who did not monitor during recall. 
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 While GREPs were nearly identical between groups for read short (M no monitoring = .47, 
SD = .22; M confidence = .47, SD = .25) and read long  (M no monitoring  = .61, SD = .20; M confidence = 
.58, SD = .25) [ts < 1], in the error generate condition, participants in the control condition 
estimated performance to be .21 worse than those who made item-by-item confidence judgments 
(M no monitoring = .42, SD = .23; M confidence = .63, SD = .26) [t (34) = 2.27, SE = .08, p = .013, d = 
.86]. 15 
Discussion 
Those in the confidence monitoring group estimated performance to be better in the error 
generation condition than did those in the no monitoring control group, who did not make any 
item-level confidence ratings during the final test. Also important to note is that the item-by-item 
confidence judgments themselves were very well calibrated with actual correct performance, 
demonstrating that participants knew on an item-by-item basis whether an item was correct or 
incorrect.  
 Therefore, even without providing explicit performance feedback, item-by-item 
confidence judgments reduced the .35 difference between performance and global estimates 
found in the control group, to only underestimating the effectiveness of the error generation 
condition by .15 in the confidence group. It seems surprising that typing a number from “0-100” 
would have such a substantial effect, as one might assume that a test taker would implicitly 
perform such an assessment even when not explicitly asked to do so. Additionally, previous 
research has shown that the act of taking a test itself has the potential to update metacognitive 
                                                
15#Overall, participants retrospectively rated their performance as best in the read long condition (M = .59, SD = 
.23), followed by error generation (M = .52, SD = .26) and then read short (M =.49 SD = .22) [main effect of 
learning condition: F (2, 68) = 5.13, MSE = .03, p < .01 ηp2= .13]. Between confidence monitoring and no 
monitoring groups, mean overall estimates were similar, signifying that monitoring did not lead to differences in 
overall global estimates of performance [F<1].#
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knowledge (c.f., Koriat & Bjork, 2006), but in this experiment (and in Huelser and Metcalfe, 
2012), we found that the cued recall test alone was not sufficient. While Experiment 3a 
demonstrated that a reduction in underconfidence is possible, the bias was not eliminated. In 
Experiment 3b, we sought to further reduce the error generation underconfidence effect. 
Experiment 3b 
One possible explanation for why underconfidence was not eliminated in Experiment 3a 
is that participants might not remember how each item had been learned. If participants 
incorrectly attribute most of the incorrectly answered items to the error generation condition, it 
should not be a surprise that globally this learning strategy is perceived as worse for learning. 
Therefore in Experiment 3b, the aim was to assure that participants could correctly 
identify the original learning strategy of an item during the criterion test. Half of the participants 
indicated in which learning condition (read short, read long, or error generation) an item had 
been studied during the learning phase. Remembering the original learning condition is a type of 
source monitoring, as well as an important component of metacognitive monitoring (Dunlosky & 
Metcalfe, 2009; Nelson & Narens, 1990). Given that we found reduced underconfidence on 
global ratings due to item-level confidence monitoring, we predicted a similar effect given 
source monitoring (c.f., McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1985). If monitoring accuracy on an item-
level updates metacognitive knowledge, heightening awareness of which items are from which 
conditions should also aid in reducing the metacognitive bias. Furthermore, what if one reflects 
upon both how one is performing and how an item was learned? A greater reduction of the bias 
might be possible in this case, while being aware of only source or only accuracy might only 
partially update metacognitive knowledge.  
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However, even if participants can identify the correct source at the item-level, this 
additional source monitoring still might not enhance global calibration above item-level 
confidence monitoring. Again, retrospective global measures have not been as predictive as those 
that occur during the task (Veenman, 2010). This could be in part due to the greater complexity of 
global judgments (Hacker, Bol & Keener, 2000). Given that our experiment consisted of 60 
tested items, with the order of learning conditions randomized during learning and again at test, 
mental summation is not likely (Winne, 1996). Tullis, Finley and Benjamin’s (2013) findings 
also suggest that further reducing the error generation underconfidence bias is not likely, even 
when prompted to monitor source. They recently demonstrated an inability to update 
metacognitive knowledge about the effectiveness of the learning conditions without directed 
guidance. Predictions for performance on a subsequent list were most accurate when participants 
received explicit feedback on their global performance for each of the learning conditions 
(testing versus study) from the previous list (Experiment 4). Specifically, participants were told 
how many items (out of 16) they had answered correctly for each of the two learning conditions. 
When participants were only informed of accuracy and learning condition source on an item 
level (Experiments 2-3), participants did not make more accurate predictions for future 
performance for tested items. Therefore, even if one knows on an item-level both performance 
accuracy and the type of learning condition, this might not be sufficient to completely override 
the error generation underconfidence effect.  
Metacognitive control: implications of monitoring on future strategy selection. Of 
additional concern are the implications of inaccurate global assessments of performance. Does 
incorrect global monitoring have consequences for later study strategy selection? This question is 
of great importance, as monitoring has consequences for metacognitive control or regulation 
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(Metcalfe, 2002, 2009; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2003, 2005; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Son & Kornell 
2008; Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Son, 2004; Son & Sethi, 2006; Stone, 2000). For example, items 
judged to be either too easy or too difficult to learn are not as likely to be selected for restudy, as 
easy items are already learned (hence, no need to re-study) and items that are too difficult might 
simply not be learned. (See Metcalfe, 2009 for a brief review research on metacognitive 
monitoring and control). In a clever set of experiments, Metcalfe and Finn (2008) were able to 
isolate the effect of monitoring on control by demonstrating that monitoring had consequences 
for metacognitive control simply by manipulating perceived learning of word pairs, without 
altering actual performance. More items were chosen for restudy when items were judged as less 
well learned, even though performance did not differ. Given the potential for monitoring to lead 
to enhanced metacognitive control, we wanted to explore if monitoring on an item level had 
consequences for strategy selection. Would learners be more likely to select error generation as a 
study strategy in the future?  
Though one might assume enhanced monitoring should automatically lead to better 
strategy selection, there are reasons to predict a disconnect between these two elements of 
metacognition. Strategy selection might be influenced by other factors, not simply related to 
performance monitoring or judgments of performance: “According to metacognitive theories, 
beliefs about the task, oneself, and the repertoire of strategies one has available all can influence 
initial strategy selection, and whether an individual continues a strategic approach or alters it in 
the face of performance-goal discrepancies.” (Hertzog et al., 2008, pg. 430) Furthermore, 
perceived difficulty of the strategy, not just its effectiveness, could also influence whether a 
particular strategy is chosen for later use (Rabinowitz, Feeman & Cohen, 1992).  In addition, 
Kornell and Son (2009) noted a disconnect between monitoring and control where participants 
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reported taking a test to lead to worse performance than repeated studying, yet they still selected 
to be tested instead of study for a subsequent to-be-learned list. Therefore, there are varying 
predictions of whether item-level source monitoring will lead to enhanced GREPs, and 
consequently a preference in choosing error generation as a study strategy for a future test. Even 
if participants give higher GREPs for error generation post-item-level monitoring (and realize it 
is helpful for learning), they still might not chose this strategy in the future, especially if one 
might perceive making errors in a negative light. Therefore, in the following experiment, we 
sought to address this question of metacognitive control by asking participants to select how 
many read short, read long, or error generation items they would like to study for a future test. 
To summarize the research questions of Experiment 3b we investigated the following: 1) 
Was underconfidence in error generation as a learning strategy simply due to an inability to 
correctly monitor which items were learned in the error generation condition? 2) With an 
additional source monitoring task, could we enhance calibration and possibly eliminate the error 
generation underconfidence effect? 3) Did estimates of performance in the three conditions 
translate into corresponding study choices? 4) What performance consequences would ensue if 
people actually used their stated condition preferences as their study strategy?   
Method 
Participants. Sixty Columbia University students participated for partial fulfillment of a 
class requirement (M Age = 21.06 years (SD = 5.67), 60% Female). Participants were randomly 
assigned to the four between subject monitoring conditions. 
Design and Materials. We used a mixed factorial design: 2 (source monitoring: no, yes) 
x 2 (confidence monitoring: no, yes) between participants factors, and 3 (learning condition: read 
short, read long, error generate) within participants factors. Each participant answered questions 
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in each of the three learning conditions. However, by crossing confidence and source monitoring 
between participants, we had four unique between participant conditions: 1) no monitoring 
(control, no source + no confidence), 2) confidence monitoring only, 3) source monitoring only, 
4) confidence + source monitoring. 
Conditions of source monitoring only and confidence + source monitoring are novel to 
the current experiment, while no monitoring and confidence monitoring only correspond to those 
from Experiment 3a. The same materials from Experiment 3a were used for the current design.  
Procedure. Procedurally, the learning phase and visuospatial filler were identical to 
those used in Experiment 3a. For the two new between-participants conditions involving source 
judgments, participants were given instructions prior to the start of the final test. On source 
judgments trials (conditions 3 and 4), participants indicated in which learning condition the cue 
had originally appeared “in the first part of the experiment.” Only the CUE word (not the target) 
was displayed and  “Original Presentation?” was above the cue. Directly above the text box, the 
following instructions were provided: “Please label in which condition this word was presented. 
If from the Separate condition, please write your previous answer.” The following prompts were 
provided below the text box on each trial as reminders of the three learning condition options: TS 
= Together Short, TL = Together Long, Original Response = Separate. [Footnote: We assumed 
that if one could provide their original response, this would be an appropriate analog for knowing 
the source was the error generation condition. On some trials, if participants could not remember 
their original error, but knew it was an error generation trial, they wrote “S” or “Separate” 
indicating the correct source. These were coded as correct.] The source judgment trial for each 
cue occurred after the cued recall trial for that item. For the source + confidence group, the order 
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of trials for each item was the following: 1) cued recall, 2) item-by-item confidence rating, 3) 
item-by-item source judgment. All trials were self-paced.16 
The Global Estimates of Performance (GREPs) were identical in each of the four 
between final test ratings conditions. Participants made GREPs by providing estimates of their 
overall average performance on the final test for each of the three learning conditions. After 
giving ratings of performance, participants briefly explained by typing into a text box why they 
estimated that condition to be the best for learning. This was free response and self-paced. 
Following GREP assessments and explanations, participants indicated how many items 
they would like to study in each of the three conditions by making a Study Strategy Choice. 
Participants were told that there were an additional 20 cue-target pairs to learn, and that they 
would be tested on these items (though this did not occur). They specified how many items (out 
of the 20) they wanted to allocate between the three different learning conditions in order to 
maximize performance on a later test (again, which never occurred).  Subsequently, they 
explained their reasoning for why they selected the most items in their preferred condition. 
Participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Initial test correct guessing. Participants correctly guessed the target for 3% of the 
learning phase trials (SD = .04), and there was no difference between participant groups [Fs < 1]. 
These correct trials were excluded from further analyses.  
                                                
16 There was a slight difference in ISI intervals between experiments. The control condition here was 1000 ms, and 
the two single monitoring conditions (source only, confidence only) had ISIs of 500 ms. Total Trials Times are 
reported in Appendix A for completeness, though not further addressed here. Critically, there were no differences in 
RTs to produce the target across the between subjects monitoring conditions for both Experiments [Fs<1]. However, 
on total trial time (even when correcting for ISI) there was a main effect of confidence monitoring for Experiment 
3.1 [F(1, 34) = 20.87, p < .01]. For Experiment 3.2, again confidence monitoring during took longer overall [F(2, 
56) = 24.60, p < .01] as did source monitoring [F(2, 56) = 39.01, p < .01].     
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Cued recall performance. Error generation during learning enhanced target recall above 
both read conditions for all groups, as displayed in Figure 3.4. A 3 (learning condition: read 
short, read long, error generation) x 2 (source monitoring: yes, no) x 2 (confidence monitoring: 
yes, no) mixed ANOVA was run, with learning condition as the within-participants factor. There 
was an error generation effect, such that correct recall was greatest in the error generation 
condition (M = .74, SD = .17), above both read long (M = .56, SD = .20) and read short (M = .53, 
SD = .19) resulting in a main effect of learning condition [F (2, 112) = 64.42, MSE = .01, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .54]. There were no significant interactions with confidence or source monitoring 
conditions [Fs <1].   
Figure 3.4 (Experiment 3b). Cued Recall. Mean cued recall performance for each of the four 
between participant groups. Performance beween groups was not altered as a function of 
confidence monitoring or source monitoring during cued recall. Overall, we still see robust 





































Item-by-item confidence judgments. Similarly to Experiment 3a, mean item-by-item 
confidence ratings were computed for participants who made item-by-item confidence ratings on 
the final cued recall test (confidence monitoring, and confidence + source monitoring groups), 
and are illustrated in Figure 3.5. (Cued recall performance is presented on the left panel and 
Item-by-item confidence score is presented on the right.) We ran a 3 (learning condition: read 
short, read long, error generation) x 2 (item type: cued recall, item-by-item confidence) x 2 
(source monitoring: yes, no) mixed ANOVA to assess how accurate item-by-item confidence 
judgments were in correspondence to cued recall performance. Again, we found item-by-item 
confidence judgments on the final test were well calibrated with performance scores. 
Participants’ item-by-item confidence judgments mirrored the demonstrated error generation 
effect found in cued recall performance, shown by a main effect of learning condition [F (1, 28) 
= 43.59, MSE = .02, p < .001, ηp2 = .61] and overall, item-by-item confidence scores were similar 
to those of their actual correct performance, as there was no main effect of item type [F =1.29, p 
Figure 3.5 (Experiment 3b). Cued Recall (left panel, solid bars) and Item-by-Item Confidence (right 
panel, striped bars). Item-by-item confidence judgments were very accurate and showed similar patterns to 
cued recall for both monitoring groups who made item-level confidence judgments (confidence 




































   
   
   
   
























= .27]. Additionally, mean item-by-item confidence judgments did not differ as a function of 
making source judgments or not [F <1], nor did this interact with learning or item type [Fs<1]. 17 
Correlations between performance and item-by-item confidence. As described above, 
the means were similar for item-by-item confidence estimates compared to actual cued recall 
performance scores. Pearson correlations between individuals’ mean performance and mean 
item-by-item confidence scores also confirmed that participants were well calibrated [rRead Short 
(30) =.83, rRead Long (30) =.87, rError Generate (30) =.68, roverall (30) =.85, ps< .001].  
In addition, for each individual, a gamma was computed to assess if participants knew 
when they answered an item correctly or incorrectly. As a perfect relative metacognitive 
accuracy would be indicated by a gamma correlation of +1.0, participants were aware of which 
items they answered correctly or not, with an overall gamma of .93 (SD = .05). Mean gammas 
did not differ between the three learning conditions (MRead Short (30) =.91, SD = .10, MRead Long 
(30) =.93, SD = .10, MError Generate (30) = .91, SD = .18) [F< 1]. 
Source judgment accuracy. Participants were capable of making source monitoring 
judgments identifying the learning condition for items presented at cued recall. They were quite 
accurate overall, correctly identifying the original learning condition on approximately 77% of 
the trials (SD = .18). Source memory for original learning condition was equally accurate 
between both those who monitored only source or both confidence and source [F < 1]. Critically, 
source memory was also similar across the three learning condition [F<1].18 Read short and read 
                                                
17 However, there was a slight trend for participants to have higher item-level confidence judgments for error 
generation items than actual cued recall performance means [F (2, 28) =2.86, MSE = .01 p = .07, ηp2 = .093] [error 
generation: MConfidence  =. 80, SD = .12; MCued Recall =.76, SD = .16 [t(30)=1.91, SE = .02, p = .07]. Note, this is in the 
opposite direction of underconfidence. For reading trials, there were no statistical differences between actual 
performance and mean item-by-item confidence judgments within learning conditions (read short: MConfidence = .54, 
SD = .21; MCued Recall =.55, SD = .20, [t <1]; read long: MConfidence = .62, SD = .20;  MRecall =.63, SD = .20 [t <1]). 
18 We recognize this partially violates the rules of independence, however, as some participants indicated “don’t 
know” these were no longer wholey dependent. 
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long trials were labeled correctly as “Together” on 75% (SD = .19) and 78% (SD = .21) of the 
time, respectively.  In addition, participants correctly identified error generation items as having 
been studied in the “Separate” condition on 78% (SD = .23) of the trials. Therefore, overall, 
participants were quite good at identifying the source of specific trials.19  In addition, making 
confidence judgments on the final test did not lead to differences in source accuracy [F < 1]. 
Global retrospective estimates of performance (GREPs). As before, participants 
reported the proportion of items they answered correctly in each of the three learning conditions. 
Each participant made these GREPs following the cued recall test. We previously found those 
who did not monitor performance during recall showed a metacognitive bias, and reported error 
generation to lead to worse recall than read long. 
Therefore, we had two research questions to address in measuring GREPs for this current 
experiment. First, we wanted to replicate the findings of Experiment 3a: Was there a difference 
in GREPs for error generation as a function of any monitoring during recall versus not 
monitoring on an item-by-item?  Secondly, were there differences in GREPs among these 
monitoring groups? To answer the first question, we collapsed over the three groups in which 
monitoring occurred during recall (confidence monitoring, source monitoring, confidence and 
source monitoring) and compared the mean GREPs of this collapsed group to the no monitoring 
group.  
We again replicated the error generation underconfidence bias for the group who did not 
monitor during the test. Monitoring helped alleviate this underconfidence, and people in all three 
                                                
19 Conditions were re-named “Together Short”, “Together Long” and “Separate.” Though participants were quite 
accurate at identifying these as reading trials, they were not as accurate at identifying the timing length (long versus 
short). On the read short trials, participants labeled .45 as short (SD = .21) and .30 as long (SD = .19). On the read 
long trials, participants labeled .33 as long (SD = .18) and .30 as short (SD = .22).] Error generation trials were 
coded as correct if participants provided their original response, or if they wrote “S” or “separate” indicating they 




monitoring groups indicated that they had the highest recall in the error generation condition. 
Using a 2 (monitoring on cued recall: yes, collapsing over monitoring conditions, no monitoring) 
x 3 (learning condition: read short, read long, error generation) mixed ANOVA there was an 
interaction of monitoring and learning [F (1,58) = 6.53, MSE = .03, p = .02, ηp2 = .10]. There 
were no differences between groups for GREPs of read short (M monitoring = .45, SD = .23; M no 
monitoring = .40, SD = .18) and read long (M monitoring = .55, SD = .23, M no monitoring = .50, SD = .20) 
(ts<1). However, those who monitored (either confidence, source, or both) estimated error 
generation to be better than those who did not (M monitoring = .63, SD = .24; M no monitoring = .40, SD 
= .26) [t (58) = 3.15, SE = .07, p = .003, d = .94]. For completeness we also report a significant 
main effect of learning condition, (M read long = .53, SD = .26; M error generation = .54, SD = .26; M read 
short = .43, SD =.24) [F (1,58) = 6.31, MSE = .03, p = .01, ηp2 = .11] and a marginal effect of 
monitoring on mean GREPs, (M monitoring = .54, SD = .20, M no monitoring .44, SD = .20) [F (1, 58) = 























































Figure 3.6 (Experiment 3b). Global Metaocgnition. Mean Global Retrospective Estimates of 
Performance (GREPS). When no monitoring occurred during the cued recall test, underconfidence in 
error generation is still evident. However, by confidence monitoring or source monitoring on the cued 




Given that monitoring led to enhanced estimates of performance for the error generation 
strategy, our second aim was to assess potential differences in GREPs between the three unique 
monitoring conditions. We used a 3 (monitoring condition: confidence, source, confidence + 
source) x 3 (learning condition: read short, read long, error generation) mixed ANOVA.  There 
was a significant main effect learning condition [F (2, 84) = 14.82, MSE = .02, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.26] such that error generation (M =.63, SD = .24) GREPs were greater than read short (M =.45, 
SD = .23)  [t (44) = 4.86, SE = .04, p < .001] and marginally higher than read long (M =.55, SD = 
.24) [t (44) = 1.96, SE = .04, p = .06]. Read long GREPs were also higher than read short [t (44) 
= 4.46, SE = .03, p < .001]. However, participants did not rate GREPs differently between these 
three monitoring conditions [no main effect of monitoring condition: F <1], nor was there an 
interaction with learning condition [F < 1].  
Study strategy choice. Does item-level monitoring have consequences for future 
selection of study strategies? After making GREPs20 participants were asked to state how many 
items (out of a possible 20) they would like to study in each of the three different learning 
conditions. Their aim was to allocate items across the three learning conditions (read short, read 
long, and error generation) in order to perform the best on a subsequent test (though this 
additional study-test session did not occur). For example, a participant might have indicated she 
wanted to study 10 items in read long, 5 in read short and 5 in error generation. Across 
participants, means for the number of items selected in each of the three learning conditions are 
presented for each of our between subject groups (no monitoring, confidence monitoring, source 
monitoring, confidence + source monitoring) in Figure 3.7  
                                                
20 And after explaining why they rated the learning conditions as they did (see Appendix for more details). 
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Figure 3.7 (Experiment 3b). Strategy Selection. Mean number of items selected for future 
study (out of a possible 20) for each of the three learning conditions, as a function of confidence 
and source monitoring during cued recall. Either confidence, source, or monitoring both during 
test led to a greater number of error generation items selected for an anticipated future study 
session. 
 
For simplicity, our dependent measure is the mean number of items selected for study in 
the error generation condition. We followed similar analyses as with the GREPs, first analyzing 
if monitoring of any kind led to a greater number of error generation items being selected for a 
future study session compared to no monitoring at final test. Those who monitored selected 
marginally more items to study in the error generation condition (M monitoring = 9.78, SD = 5.57) 
than those who did not (M no monitoring = 6.60, SD = 6.45) [t (58) = 1.87, SE = .06, p = .066, d = 
.55]. In addition to the raw number items selected for the error generation condition, we also 
assessed the mean ranking across participants to see if those who monitored selected the most 
items for error generation relative to the other read conditions. In other words, what was the 
preferred condition for future study? Using a similar ranking procedure as in Huelser & Metcalfe 


































the middle condition received a score 1, and the lowest a score of 0.21 Using this relative rank 
method, we confirmed that those in the monitoring groups opted to select more error generation 
items (relative to the other two learning conditions) than those who did not monitor  (M monitoring = 
1.48, SD = .78, M no monitoring = .80, SD = 1.01) [Wilcox/Mann-WhitneyU: Z = 1.98, p = .048]. 
In addition to assessing if there was any effect of monitoring during recall on strategy 
selection, we wanted to determine if there were differences between the three monitoring groups 
(confidence monitoring, source monitoring, or both) on how many word pairs they would like to 
study in the error generation condition. Using a 3 (monitoring group: confidence monitoring, 
source monitoring, confidence + source monitoring) one-way ANOVA, we found no significant 
differences in how many items were allocated to future study in the error generation condition as 
a function of monitoring group (F<1). We also assessed relative rank of items selected for future 
study, and found no difference between these monitoring groups for selection of error generation 
items (Wilcox/Mann-WhitneyU, p = .39).  
Discussion 
Overall, in Experiment 3b we demonstrated that item-level monitoring during the 
criterion test enhanced global retrospective estimates for the effectiveness of the error generation 
condition, simply by making judgments of accuracy (confidence monitoring) or reflecting upon 
original learning strategy (source monitoring). As participants’ accuracy of source was quite high 
and not different between the three learning conditions, we can assume overall that 
underconfidence in using errors as a learning strategy is not based on poor source monitoring of 
the learning condition. In addition to making confidence judgments, source monitoring can also 
                                                
21 For example, if a student assigned error generation 10 items for future study, read long 6 and read short only 4, 
error generation would be given a rank score of 2. We also accounted for ties by assigning half-points (e.g. If both a 
participant requested 8 items in each error generation and read long, and 4 in read short, the ranking scores would be 
1.5, 1.5, 0 respectively. 
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help make a learner more aware of when error generation is beneficial. In fact, there were no 
differences among our three monitoring groups: those who monitored only confidence, only 
source, or did both monitoring tasks all showed higher global retrospective estimates of 
performance than those who did not monitor. In addition those who monitored during the 
criterion test tended to select more error generation items for a potential future study session, 
suggesting implications for metacognitive control. 
General Discussion 
 In the current chapter, we demonstrated several novel findings on the metacognition of 
learning by making errors. In Chapter 1 (Huelser and Metcalfe, 2012), we demonstrated that 
participants did not rank error generation to be the best condition for learning. In Experiment 3a, 
we replicated these findings with global retrospective performance estimates, demonstrating that 
without monitoring at final test, learners estimated error generation to be less effective than 
reading the cue-target pairs for 10 seconds. However, when participants were asked to explicitly 
monitor their confidence in accuracy for each item on the criterion test, learners estimated error 
generation to be better than reading the items for a short period of time. 
In Experiment 3b, we elaborated further on these findings, by demonstrating that 
participants were able to report source memory for how each item was originally learned. This 
supports that the underconfidence in learning by making errors was not due to an inability to 
judge source. Additionally, source monitoring also provided an opportunity for metacognitive 
knowledge updating, similar to confidence monitoring, as errorful learning was estimated to lead 
to enhanced retention above the control condition in which no monitoring took place. Still, we 
have not yet addressed why reflecting upon confidence and/or source might lead to decreased 
bias against error generation as an effective learning strategy. 
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Correctly Updating Metacognitive Knowledge 
Although our methods of item-level monitoring can be used to update and correct 
metacognitive knowledge, the reason why monitoring during recall reduced the error generation 
metacognitive illusion is an important topic to explore. Veenman (2010) elaborated on the 
differences between metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experiences. Global 
metacognitive knowledge is declarative-memory based information, subject to reconstruction 
and modification (Winne,1996; Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Winne & Jamieson-Noel, 2002), and is 
largely an inferential process (Herztog et al., 2008). Metacognitive experiences, on the other-
hand, involve on-line monitoring of an experience during a task and are implicitly derived by a 
number of non-conscious sources (eg. liking, curiosity, surprise; see Efklides, 2006). Though 
metacognitive experiences might be implicit, once made consciously aware of the nature of these 
experiences, this declarative information then has the potential to be updated and become more 
stable metacognitive knowledge (Veenman, 2010), consistent with how other mental schema can 
be updated and revised (Winne & Jamieson-Noel, 2002). Given this line of reasoning, overtly 
responding to monitoring prompts forces participants to make these implicit item-level 
experiences of accuracy and source become explicit, highlighting the benefits of error 
generation. Thus, this monitoring allows one to correctly update metacognitive knowledge. 
Furthermore, in Hertzog et al.’s (2008) model based on encoding using imagery being more 
effective than rote study, several factors are outlined that are predictive of strategy knowledge 
updating. They highlight the importance of monitoring for updating metacognitive knowledge, 
and specifically monitoring on an item-level at retrieval to be contribute to overall global 
monitoring and strategy knowledge updating. Our findings on the reduction of the error 
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generation underconfidence bias are consistent with their model, and offer further support for the 
critical importance of monitoring during retrieval.  
What is perhaps most interesting about the error generation underconfidence bias, and 
other recent work on overt-monitoring as a means of updating metacognitive knowledge, is that 
one might assume monitoring would occur naturally even without being prompted. The act of 
simply taking a test has been shown to be beneficial for updating metacognitive knowledge, in 
essence, because testing helps learners realize which items they are answering correctly or 
incorrectly (Koriat & Bjork, 2006; Hertzog et al. 2008). Even if item-level monitoring is taking 
place implicitly, making this process explicit by providing prompts could be “forcing” meta-
level updating and evaluations of errors as an effective study strategy. However, difficult tasks 
beyond the ability of the learner will lead to a decrease in monitoring (Winne, 1996) and 
incorrect heuristics might be applied (Prins, Veenman & Elshut, 2006). It could be that our cued 
recall test itself is difficult22, therefore, without explicit monitoring prompts, one might not be 
allocating additional cognitive resources to metacognitive monitoring and to updating 
metacognitive knowledge. This would be consistent with work that has shown enhanced 
calibration for higher performing students, (e.g. Bol & Hacker, 2001; Dunning, Kerri, Erlinger & 
Kruger, 2003) as perhaps they might tend to utilize more effective metacognitive strategies 
(Butler & Winne,1995; Winne, 1995, 1997). In addition, several studies suggest monitoring 
ability is of greater importance for metacognitive updating than intelligence (Pressley & Ghatala, 
1990; Veenman, 2008; Schraw, 1994). Though beyond the scope of the current work, what might 
evolve is an interesting picture of the effects of performance and monitoring ability on the 
perception of the error generation benefit. 
                                                
22 It at least takes longer to monitor both confidence and source, as noted in Appendix B. 
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Implications for Metacognitive Control 
Metcalfe (2009) summarized much of the work done on implications of metacognitive 
monitoring and how one’s assessment of learning influences study strategy selection, suggesting 
a direct link between monitoring and metacognitive control. Determining if our manipulation of 
confidence and source monitoring at test also yielded improved strategy selection is of great 
importance. Data from Experiment 3b regarding the connection between item-level 
metacognitive monitoring and subsequent number of items selected for study in the error 
generation condition indicate that monitoring during test does seem to have implications for 
metacognitive control. Either monitoring how an item was encoded (source) or the level of 
accuracy (confidence) led to more error generation items allotted for future study than when no 
monitoring occurred on the final test. Metacognitive control is likely influenced by many other 
factors other than input from performance monitoring, such as beliefs about one’s own abilities 
and task difficulty (Bandura, 1997; Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998; Hertzog et al., 2008; Metcalfe, 
2009; Pintrich, Wolters, & Baxter, 2000). Therefore, we believe our simple manipulations of 
item-level monitoring to be impressive; assessing performance and source led to enhanced 
metacognitive control. 
In summary, the bias against learning by making errors is malleable. There are a number 
of possible research options to explore regarding the source of the error generation 
underconfidence effect, which we will briefly discuss in Chapter 4. While future research is 
needed to disentangle the origin of this metacognitive illusion, we demonstrated metacognitive 
knowledge about errors can be updated simply by monitoring performance and assessing how 
one originally learned information. This is a simple, yet impressive manipulation, to enhance 
awareness of when errors help learning. Prompts to monitor and assess performance were 
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sufficient to make a learner aware of the utility of learning by making errors, which otherwise, is 






























Conclusions and Future Directions 
Research on the topic of learning by making errors has been conducted across varying 
fields: cognitive psychology, education, animal learning, clinical psychology, organizational 
behavior, and neuroscience. Yet, the question of when and why errors can help enhance learning 
is far from resolved. In part, this is a result of each field using its own methodology, materials, 
and situations (e.g. pubic or private; at school compared to the office). Furthermore, there are 
even differences in the definition of “error” (e.g. procedural, vs. declarative, severe or easily 
overcome), which makes a unified theory of error utility a difficult feat. If the goal is to be able 
to use this research to inform when learning is helpful and to understand why it is beneficial, 
dynamic collaboration is key.  
 The current body of work, which focuses on the foundations of the cognitive components 
of the error generation effect, is a critical first step in creating a groundwork upon which to build 
integrative theories about when and why error generation is beneficial for memory. We hope it 
inspires more research spanning multiple domains, as we are far from understanding the 
complicated and dynamic process of learning from errors. Many questions remain from both 
memory and metacognitive perspectives.  
Error Generation and Remaining Questions 
Memorial Mechanism 
 Throughout this dissertation, generating errors followed by correct answer feedback led 
to enhanced memory over simply studying the correct answer, even when given twice the 
amount of time to study the correct cue and answer pairing. As being able to recall one’s original 
error led to better memory for the correct answer in Chapter 2, our results are consistent with 
episodic recollection as one role of generating errors plays in aiding retrieval. Yet, there are 
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many future directions to pursue to further elucidate the potential episodic role of the error. If 
retrieving the error affords episodic remembering of the original event, then we might expect 
enhanced context memory when the original error and/or correct answer is retrieved. This 
research is currently ongoing in the lab and draws a parallel to neuroimaging research. Showing 
the activation associated with a previous target is also present at the time of retrieval suggests 
activation of prior episodic memory for an unrelated (non-target) event (Kuhl, Bainbridge, & 
Chun, 2012). By adapting our current paradigms for imaging, these neurological data, in 
combination with behavioral data, would further inform the mechanism of the error generation 
effect, and might reveal interesting interactions between memory systems. More research is 
needed to fully understand the direct role of the error in these declarative tasks. It may even be 
the case that we cannot view the error’s contribution as simply “episodic” or “semantic”, as our 
understanding of memory systems is evolving and yielding a more complex and dynamic 
interplay between what was once viewed as dichotomous (Shohamy & Trurk-Browne, 2013; 
Shohamy & Wager, 2008). Perhaps in order to mentally time travel back to one’s error and re-
experience the errorful episode (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997), a meaningful context into 
which to bind this information is a pre-requisite (Conway, 2009). Furthermore, if episodic 
memory requires a sense of self and self-knowing (c.f. Wheeler et. al, 1997), there is still 
opportunity to elaborate on the role of the “self” in error generation. For example, if one 
remembers someone else’s error, would the error still serve as a mediator? Pursuing this research 
would help inform theory, as well as, contribute to the practical implications of this research, 
such as when to implement an errorful strategy in the classroom. 
 Individual differences. In addition, further research of individual differences helps 
inform memory theory beyond the limited scope of errors. If episodic memory is critical for an 
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error generation benefit, further examining subgroups with episodic remembering deficits would 
help enrich our understanding of mechanism theory. For example, some recent work has shown 
mixed results for the effectiveness of an error generation strategy for learning (Middleton & 
Schwartz, 2012). However, the reason behind these results is still unclear. Is error generation 
ineffective as a study strategy for older adults because of source confusion and interference 
between the error and target (Anderson & Craik, 2006; for a review, see Spencer & Raz, 1995), 
or because those with episodic memory deficits can no longer recall their original error and 
original encoding episode (c.f. Dunlosky et al., 2008)? By examining various populations and the 
efficacy of error generation as a learning strategy, we can begin to more richly understand the 
mechanism of the error generation benefit.  
Additional Analyses: Universality of the Error Generation Effect   
In further thinking of potential individual differences, was error generation always best 
for everyone in our paradigm? While error generation led to higher rates of cued recall in nearly 
all the experiments presented, there is the possibility that when a participant claimed that “read 
long” was best, it was in fact the best condition for that individual. In order to answer this 
question, we examined the mean performance on the cued recall tests collapsed over 
Experiments 1a, 3a, and 3b. See Figure 4.1 for mean cued recall performance in each of the three 
learning conditions (read short, read long, error generation) as a function of which condition 
participants reported to be the “best” condition for learning (omitting participants who 
subjectively rated read short as best due to small sample size). These comparisons illustrate 
whether generating errors enhanced learning above simply studying for those who claimed read 
long to be the best condition for learning. Even for those who believed long to be best, error 





We ran a 3 x (learning condition: read short, read long, error generation) x 2 (subjective 
preference: error generation best, read long best) mixed ANOVA on the proportion correct on 
the cued recall test. Overall, we see robust benefits of error generation on learning over read [F 
(2, 196) = 92.99, MSE = .01, p < .001, ηp2 = .48]. Furthermore, it is important to note that those 
who rated error generation to be best for learning did not outperform those who rated read long 
to be best, as indicated by a lack of a main effect of subjective preference [F<1].  Yet, we found 
that even for those participants who “claimed read long was best”, the error generation effect was 
still evident, but the benefit was larger for those who believed “error generation was best” 
(significant interaction [F (2,196) = 9.04, MSE = .01. p < .001, ηp2 = .08]). Although our errorful 
learning task was beneficial for nearly everyone (only 17 participants actually performed better 
in read long out of 115 participants), these results also highlight that some learners benefit more 
Figure 4.1 (Collapsed over Experiments 1a, 3a, & 3b). Mean cued recall 
performance as a function of which condition was ranked/rated as “best” for 
learning. Though error generation effect was largest when participants ranked  as 
error generation best, the error generation effect is present regardless of which 
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than others from efforful learning.23 (See Appendix E for a scatter plot of the mean difference 
score of error generation above the mean cued recall of the read conditions.) 
 Along these lines, it is important to note the situation in in which these learners were 
asked to both study and take the test. Our current paradigm was rather innocuous (and, 
anecdotally, “fun” according to discussions with participants post-task). Participants were alone 
in a room, guessing paired associates, the data were anonymous, and the word “error” was never 
mentioned by the experimenter. It is hard to imagine a "lower risk" scenario. Therefore, it is 
perhaps not as surprising that error generation was beneficial, as hopefully there was minimal 
negative emotion to modulate performance. However, what if the experimenter never left the 
room and observed the errors? Or if participants were told the experiment was a test of 
intelligence? Our seemingly innocuous task suddenly might be interpreted differently, induce 
threat, and perhaps no longer be as universally beneficial (Chalabaev, Major, Sarrazin, & Cury, 
2011). Understanding the factors that increase fit (Higgins, 2000) with error generation would 
likely have implications for both one’s approach and ability to learn from errors (deLange & 
Kippenberg, 2009; Dweck & Legget, 1998). Furthermore, there is likely a dynamic interplay 
between cognitive abilities and emotion (e.g. emotion regulation, c.f. Ochsner & Gross, 2005) in 
determining when error generation will aid or hurt learning (see Zhao, 2011), and is of critical 
importance to explore. 
Error Generation Underconfidence Bias 
Still, we find it surprising that without monitoring performance, immediately post-task 
learners did not know that error generation was beneficial strategy for learning. In Chapter 3 we 
demonstrated that the error generation underconfidence bias does not exist on the item-level, but 
                                                
23 Note, overall performance between error generation as best and read long as best are not different from each other 
[F = 1.12, p = .27]. 
  
 85 
it instead appears when asked to reflect globally upon performance. Though we cannot currently 
disentangle the source of the underconfidence bias, we know it is malleable as we were able to 
reduce it through the item-level monitoring in Chapter 3.  
Self-report data and questions about the source of the metacognitive bias. As a 
preliminary measure to seek further insight of the source of the error generation underconfidence 
bias, in Experiments 3a and 3b, we directly asked participants to report why a condition was best 
for learning. Summaries of these self-report data are presented in Appendices C and D, and 
highlight particular reasons that were included in the participants’ responses. We anticipated that 
individuals might report, “I do not like making errors” as a plausible explanation for why the 
read long condition was best, but no participant overtly reported such a stark claim. This in part 
suggests that the bias might not be based simply upon a firmly-held pre-existing metacognitive 
belief that making errors is a negative.24 Therefore, it is of interest to further pursue individual 
differences in the error generation underconfidence bias as a function of pre-experimental beliefs 
Of note were participant reports that involved processes at encoding (e.g. more time and 
fewer distractions) for why read long was best. In essence, generating an error might seem more 
“effortful” compared to simply reading the word pairs during the encoding phase. Along similar 
lines, retrieval might not seem as fluent and straightforward for the error generation items, due to 
the possibility of the mental presence of the error at retrieval (also as suggested by the self-report 
data). Most interestingly, participants who selected the read long condition as best for learning 
described the error itself as interference, while participants who selected error generation as best 
                                                
24 Based on pilot data, it appears the students in the Columbia University participant pool do not have a negative bias 
against making errors, in general. See Appendix B for a list of means and standard deviations, t-test and p values for 
comparisons to a score of neutrality. Measures of Learning from Errors (e.g. “Mistakes help me to improve my 
work”), Competence (e.g. “When I have made a mistake, I know immediately how to correct it”) and Error Risk 
Taking (e.g. “I’d prefer to err than to do nothing at all”) are all rated above neutral (ps<.01), while Error Stress (e.g. 




described the error as a useful mediator, although both groups reported the mental presence of 
the error equally. Does this merely indicate a difference of interpretation by the participants,  
does it contribute to bias, and furthermore, might this suggest that individuals have different 
mechanisms for learning by making errors?    
In addition to understanding why learners are originally underconfident with regards to 
the benefits of error generation, of great importance is the persistence of this metacognitive bias 
and the benefits of correctly updated metacognitive knowledge over an extended period of time. 
In other words, are there are long-term benefits of monitoring performance, and if so, does it 
make one more likely to select the most effective learning strategy in the future? The real world 
application of generating errors as a learning strategy may not be useful if item-level monitoring 
only updates metacognitive knowledge immediately, and a learner does not select to use the best 
strategy in the future. While we began to investigate this issue in Experiment 3b by asking 
participants to select which study conditions they would use on a future test, further experiments 
would help enrich our understanding of this critical question.  
Empirical Questions to Inform Theory 
Of course, one of the most apparent extensions of our current work is to vary the type of 
study materials used during experiments. Associative materials are useful in attempting to isolate 
and investigate boundary materials, but they are limited in ecological validity. Though some 
studies show promise of error generation effects using various materials (e.g. educational text 
(Hayes, Kornell & Bjork, 2009), various computer tasks (Keith & Frese, 2008, for a review), 
statistics (Swartz & Martin, 2004)) others have not been as successful (e.g. science materials, 
(McDaniel et al., 2010), trivia (Kang et al. 2011)). Are these mixed literature findings due to the 
task type (cued recall verses multiple choice), materials (general knowledge trivia, science text, 
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paired associates) or situation (during class, or at home, or online)? By investigating and 
isolating further boundary conditions, we can enrich our understanding of the error generation 
effect and its mechanisms, and begin to find real world application for this effective learning 
strategy.  
Final Thoughts 
 We would like to end by restating an important caveat of this research: Errors made 
without receiving correct feedback are likely to remain incorrect (Butler, Karpicke & Roediger 
2008; Fazio, Huelser, Johnson & Marsh, 2010; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2007; Pashler Cepeda 
Wixted & Roher, 2005; Pashler, Zarow & Triplett, 2003). Despite this limitation to learning 
through errors, the potential benefits of error generation for memory should not be overlooked. 
Despite the overwhelming post-task metacognitive illusion that errors are harmful to learning, 
this challenging strategy can lead to enhanced memory (consistent with Desirable Difficulties 
Framework (c.f. Schmidt & Bjork, 1992) and Region of Proximal Learning (Metcalfe & Kornell, 
2002, 2003)). As one participant reported, “[Error Generation] was my best [option], because 
having to type out a word and then looking to see if my word was right ingrained the correct pain 
more in my memory.”  When you get corrective feedback, a little “pain” from making an error 
can enhance learning. Hopefully, simply by making basic metacognitive reflections, more 
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M SD t  p 
 Error Orientation Questionnaire Constructs: 
# # # #        EOQ: Error Competence, e.g. "know how to correct" 0.58 0.75 5.55 0 
        EOQ: Learning from Errors, e.g. "help me improve" 0.75 1.27 4.21 0 
        EOQ: Error Risk Taking, e.g. "prefer to err than do nothing" 0.75 0.86 6.24 0 
        EOQ: Stress from Errors , e.g. "stressful when I err" 0.02 1.03 0.14 0.89 
! Making errors on an assignment helps me figure out what I need to study for the test. 0.99 1.03 6.85 0 
! When I'm confident that I know the correct answer, making a mistake is particularly disappointing. 0.91 1.17 5.55 0 
! I tend to remember questions that I previously made mistakes on. 0.9 1.02 6.29 0 
! A mistake is really just an opportunity for learning. 0.65 1.34 3.45 0 
! Making a mistake often leads me to the correct answer. 0.59 1.18 3.55 0 
! Putting effort into recalling an answer is helpful even if it leads to a mistake. 0.55 1.17 3.35 0 
! Making a mistake often helps when learning how to perform a new skill. 0.52 1.28 2.89 0.01 
! Making a mistake before I learn the correct answer sometimes improves my learning. 0.37 1.2 2.23 0.03 
! I'm careful to avoid making mistakes whenever I'm learning something. 0.29 1.19 1.77 0.08 
! When something is complicated, I'm not particularly bothered by   making mistakes. 0.26 1.21 1.56 0.13 
! When approaching a new activity, I like to jump in and learn from my mistakes. 0.25 1.18 1.54 0.13 
! Making mistakes motivates me to continue learning. 0.25 1.26 1.39 0.17 
! When I get everything right, it means I'm not challenging myself enough. -0.12 1.35 0.62 0.54 
! Trial and error is my preferred learning strategy. -0.19 1.29 1.03 0.31 
! Having my mistakes corrected feels embarrassing. -0.2 1.4 1 0.32 
! Making a mistake is only helpful if I find out the correct answer right away. -0.36 1.34 1.94 0.06 
! When I make a lot of mistakes, I feel like giving up. -0.44 1.13 2.8 0.01 
! Making an incorrect guess initially can get in the way of remembering the correct answer later. -0.47 1.25 2.68 0.01 
! When I make a mistake, I become distracted and unable to focus on the task at hand. -0.54 1.13 3.42 0 
! It does not bother me to make mistakes -0.56 1.13 3.55 0 
! When I try to do something on my own before learning the correct answer, I only become more frustrated. -0.76 1.08 5.04 0 
! I find it difficult to remember the correct answer after having made a mistake. -0.87 1 6.24 0 
! A mistake represents a personal shortcoming. -1.19 1.2 7.04 0 
Appendix A 
Error Attitudes (Columbia University, Spring 2014). Fifty-one Columbia University Students’ 
Error Attitudes. The first four items are mean compontents from Error Orientation Questionnairre 
(EOQ) [Rybowiak et al (1999)]. Ratings have a neutral score of 0 (ranging from -2 to +2). A 





Mean Reaction Time Data 
 
Reaction times for Experiments 3a and 3b as a function of Trial Type (Cued Recall, 
Confidenece, or Source Judgments). Total Trial time accounts for ISI. 
 
 
Critically, there were no differences in RTs to produce the target across the between subjects 
monitoring conditions for both Experiments [Fs<1]. However, on total trial time (even when 
correcting for ISI) there was a main effect of confidence monitoring for Experiment 3.1 [F(1, 34) 
= 20.87, p < .01]. For Experiment 3.2, again confidence monitoring during took longer overall 






Favored Learning Condition Self Report Data  (Experiments 3a and 3b) 
 
Percentage of participants who reported each of the strategies above to explain why their selected 
strategy was best for learning. Sample responses for each category are listed in Appendix D. 
Note, the total will sum to greater than 100% as participants reported a mean of 2.28 reasons (M 
= 2.28,  SD = .75).  
 
Read short was excluded, as only 11 participants reported this as the best learning strategy and 














Favored Learning Condition Self Report Data : 
Sample Free Report Responses and ChiSquare Values 
Chi Squares (χ²) between error generation or read long reported as best for condition, within each 
category. Note, despite differences in valence of the error, both groups reported similar rates of 









Category Sample Free Responses (Self-Report) χ ² 
Other / Feels Better For some reason, it was a lot easier to recall the thought processes that occurred 0.78 
Error Interfered If I guess wrong, I might remember the wrong answer instead of the correct answer 11.35 ** 
Error helped Mediate I generally remembered what I had said; I knew why I got that wrong and then I remembered it going further for the last part 14.35 *** 
Longer Time to Encode The longer display of words lead to the best performance because I had more time to learn the pair; More Exposure 17.86*** 
Fewer Distractions 
(or more for other) 
Distracted me from learning the correct word; If something distracted me, I 
risked barely or not making the connection at all 4.84* 
Feedback  
(Compare to Correct) 
Thinking about how this word was different from the one you typed in; 
Entered a word different from the eventual second word helped me to 
remember the second word 
20.78*** 
More Attention Kept the mind occupied; Paid more attention 1.89 
Enhanced Processing 
(Mnemonics) 
I have to think about the word and its meaning and engage with it; Less 
about rote memory, and more about forming the precursors of a literal 
relationship between the two 
3.64* 
Associated Error&Target  I associated my answer and the correct answer 23.67*** 
Associated Cue&Target Absorb both words; Process meaning of the word pair 13.96*** 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Self-report data were categorized by an independent coder who was not aware of the hypotheses of the 
experiment. Categories were created based on participant responses. up to three reasons were coded for 




Scatter Plot Data of Error Generation Effect Benefit Sixe 






















Error Generation Benefit Size 
 
Difference score of cued recall performance in the error generation condition above the 
mean cued recall of the read conditions [Error generation Performance – (Mean (Read Long, 
Read Short) Performance]. Collapsing across Experiments 1a, 3a, and 3b (all weakly related 
word pairs). Data are parsed into bins according to which condition a participant reported as 
being subjectively “best” for performance. Though semi-redundant with the y-axis, the data 
points are colored by which condition was actually best for learning. Any data point above 0 
indicates that error generation led to a benefit in performance above mean cued recall collapsed 
over read conditions. It is of interest to note that the metacognitive illusion is uni-directional: 
Rarely do participants report read long as best when error generation was best for cued recall 
performance.  
 
N = 15      N = 48              N = 52 
